A Case for Constructive Conceptual Explanation
Chapter 3: Conceptual explanation and contingency
AbstractUsing Hart’s conceptual theory of law as an illustration, this chapter shows how analytical legal theory has internal resources enabling it to characterize law in terms of contingent features and relations, and not just the necessary features and relations it has historically sought to find and explain. This chapter emphasizes in particular that Hart’s conceptual theory of law is best understood not as a report of some familiar intuitions about law manifested in ordinary language use, but instead as a philosophical construction, comprised of several interconnected theses presented to highlight important features and relations of law wherever and whenever it exists.
You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.
Elgaronline requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books or journals. Please login through your library system or with your personal username and password on the homepage.
Non-subscribers can freely search the site, view abstracts/ extracts and download selected front matter and introductory chapters for personal use.
Your library may not have purchased all subject areas. If you are authenticated and think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.