Our point of departure in Chapter 4 is H. Scott Gordon model of a fishery as a common-pool resource. Gordon's model clarified the important of property rights in managing fisheries but it did not explicitly consider that people come together to manage a fishery without relying on a centralized authority. We revisit two important cases in the institutional literature on fisheries: Native American potlatching (gift-giving) arrangements in the Pacific Northwest salmon fishery and lobster gangs in the New England lobster fishery. These cases illustrate the potential for communities to manage the commons. For ocean fisheries, we then show how individual transferable quotas - free market solutions to fisheries governance - work well in governing fish stocks. International anarchy makes enforcing property rights on the high seas challenging. Ocean grabbing is also an issue, though we argue it is a government rather than market failure.
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Front Matter
