Stabilization and Adjustment in Egypt
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Stabilization and Adjustment in Egypt

Reform or De-Industrialization

Gouda Abdel-Khalek

This book studies the impact of Egypt’s Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Programme (ERSAP), the effects of which have been of great interest to the international community. Organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF uphold the programme as a success story and example for other countries to follow. ERSAP also has its critics, however, who resent its tendency to downsize government and fear possible negative effects on growth and development. The author discusses these concerns along with those regarding the possible negative social effects of ERSAP.
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Chapter 4: The Main Features of the Manufacturing Sector

Gouda Abdel-Khalek


INTRODUCTION As early as 1983, a World Bank study on Egypt underscored the need for a concentrated effort over the following two decades to achieve an investment rate of 30–35 per cent (World Bank, 1983, p. 45). The study also pointed out that, according to the most desirable scenario based on an optimal growth path of the Egyptian economy, Egypt would have to raise the share of merchandise exports in domestic production of tradables from 13 per cent to 35 per cent over the planning horizon to 2012 (World Bank, 1983, p. 23). In addition to the World Bank study mentioned above, several other studies were undertaken to deal with various aspects of the manufacturing sector in Egypt. The most important are CAPMAS (1985); World Bank (1983, 1984, 1987); USAID (1979); Papanek (1981); Jones (1981); and Ministry of Industry (1986 and 1998). The essence of all these studies is that there are a number of problems besetting the manufacturing activity and inhibiting its dynamic growth. In 1991/92 industrial output actually amounted to LE 21 409 million and industrial exports LE 5762 million, or about 27 per cent of industrial output. The five-year plan 1992/93–1996/97 rekindled the old hopes by targeting industrial exports to reach 40 per cent of industrial output by 1996/97, implying a growth rate of industrial exports averaging 16 per cent per annum in real terms during the plan period (see Appendix, Table 4A.1). The plan document, however, did not spell out the policy instruments which...

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