Chapter 16: National-regional-local shifting games in multi-tiered welfare states
Restricted access

In multitiered welfare states, different levels of government have two options when it comes to reducing their caseloads: they can help clients re-enter the labour market or try to offload them onto programs that belong to another tier. This practice has been termed "cost shifting". However, some institutional contexts are more likely to be conducive to cost shifting. In this contribution, we present a theoretical argument that identifies the following as key independent variables for cost shifting practices 1) the degree of fiscal autonomy, notably tax autonomy, of the subnational levels of government; and 2) the degree of centralization of welfare state governance. The chapter shows how strong fiscal autonomy for lower levels of government, such as municipalities, is associated with a higher incentive to practice cost shifting. On the other hand, centralized welfare state governance allows the central government to limit these practices and to restrict municipalities' scope of action.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Other access options

Redeem Token

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institutional Access

Personal login

Log in with your Elgar Online account

Login with your Elgar account