Chapter 2: Austrian phenomenology
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In this chapter I attempt to contextualize Mises's praxeological philosophy within contemporary debates over the philosophy of social science. In particular, German and Austrian philosophers had been debating the merits of Edmund Husserl's advancement of Dilthey's and Brentano's work in developing 'phenomenology.' It is in the context of this advancement, I argue, that Mises developed praxeology. Specifically, I assert that Mises's praxeology fits squarely within a once prominent but since-forgotten camp of phenomenology called realist phenomenology. Realist phenomenology lost its prominence due to political interference - particularly from the rise of the Nazi regime, against which realist phenomenologists were outspoken. This tradition, however, and particularly the works of Adolph Reinach and Max Scheler, appears to have greatly influenced Mises, whether directly or indirectly. In short, I argue that praxeology belongs within the tradition of phenomenology, akin to but rather distinct from the more radical branches that are more familiar.

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