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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the theoretical position criticized by Greenberg and namely so-called by him 'the communicative-content theory of law', or for short, 'the Communication Theory'. We will argue that at least in continental jurisprudence, the Communication Theory is not the 'default position', irrespective whether we understand it as a normative theory, or if we understand it as a descriptive theory. We claim that the rejection of the Communication Theory forces us neither to accept interpretivism nor to reject legal positivism. The claim of Greenberg that the nature of law determines which interpretative practices are correct seems to us false. In our view, the answer to the question which method of interpretation is correct does not depend on which legal theory is true with respect to the metaphysical determination of law. Legal positivism does not aim at discovery of the correct method of legal interpretation. Legal positivism is mainly a theory of legal validity, claiming that validity of law is solely a matter of social facts. As far as the content of valid norms is concerned, it is the method of interpretation that a given community considers correct that determines the content of law. Legal positivism, as a descriptive theory of law, has little to say about normative interpretative theories. Legal positivists are not compelled to accept the Communication Theory or any other interpretative theory. Such theories must be based both on a certain account of meaning, as well on certain values of political morality. From this perspective, normative interpretative theories do tell us how to discover the true content of law. Their purpose is rather to influence judges, officials, and lawyers how to determine what law should be.

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