Handbook of Research Methods on Intuition
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Handbook of Research Methods on Intuition

Edited by Marta Sinclair

How does one go about studying intuition – a complex, cross-disciplinary field, which is still developing? How can intuition be captured in situ? How can a researcher harness their own intuition? This book uses method-related themes to help answer these questions and explore innovative developments in intuition research.
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Chapter 1: Why people think deeply: meta-cognitive cues, task characteristics and thinking dispositions

Ryan E. Smerek


This chapter explores the monitoring process of analytic thinking and when we intervene to endorse, correct or override our intuitive responses. I take a dual-process approach and use the System 1 and System 2 distinction proposed by Stanovich and West (2000), among many others (Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003). System 1 is categorized as judgments that are fast, high capacity, independent of working memory and cognitive ability, while System 2 is slow, low capacity, heavily dependent on working memory and related to individual differences in cognitive ability (Evans, 2011). This distinction places the use of working memory as the central difference between System 1 and System 2, thus preserving the discrete, non-continuous nature of dual-processes (see Evans, 2012). The System 1/System 2 distinction requires nuance, however, as Stanovich (2009) and others have argued, with a third type of process that serves as a monitoring mechanism. Stanovich (2009) labels the source of monitoring the ‘reflective mind,’ while De Neys and Glumicic (2008) hypothesize constant ‘shallow analytic monitoring’ by System 2. The need for monitoring helps us understand why a particular response will come under the control of System 2 and how conflicts are resolved between the two processes. In this regard, I take a ‘default-interventionist’ approach, meaning System 1 is primarily relied upon for judgment and decision making unless otherwise intervened by System 2 and working memory (Evans, 2007).

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