Chapter 48: Reason
Restricted access

In contemporary legal thought, it is frequently claimed or simply presumed that reason rules or ought to rule. But if this view is to be more than a conceit, it would be necessary for legal thinkers to address the challenges that reason confronts when faced with a law whose authorities, aesthetics and self-idealization seem resistant to reason. That sort of encounter simply has not happened in any serious way. Based on a close reading of crucial passages in Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire, this chapter shows how instead the ‘partisans of reason’ elide challenges to reason through a characteristic reductionism and purification of law. This rhetorical elision is ultimately a betrayal of reason itself. Predictably, it yields an enchantment of reason.

You are not authenticated to view the full text of this chapter or article.

Access options

Get access to the full article by using one of the access options below.

Other access options

Redeem Token

Institutional Login

Log in with Open Athens, Shibboleth, or your institutional credentials

Login via Institutional Access

Personal login

Log in with your Elgar Online account

Login with your Elgar account
Handbook