Chapter 16: The deterrence value of stockholder appraisal
Category:
Handbook Chapter
Published:
30 Sep 2016
Page Range:
335–351
Collection:
Law 2016
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784711481.00030
Restricted access

This chapter provides an overview of modern appraisal litigation, describes a backlash among defendants and their advisors, and evaluates the chief potential argument levied against appraisal. The principal justification for appraisal is that, at the margin, it deters transactions that would deliver too little value to stockholders, as compared to remaining independent. The available evidence suggests that appraisal can serve this deterrence function better than other forms of merger-related litigation.

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Cover Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions
Research Handbook on Mergers and Acquisitions
Handbook
Published:
30 Sep 2016
Print ISBN:
9781784711474
eISBN:
9781784711481
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781784711481
Pages:
c 496
Collection:
Law 2016
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