Chapter 7: Parliamentary bills of rights: have they altered the norms for legislative decision-making?
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Abstract: This chapter evaluates whether judicial review influences legislative norms in several Westminster-based jurisdictions that have overcome historical antipathy to a bill of rights while also adopting new processes for reviewing if proposed legislation complies with rights. These new processes for evaluating whether and how legislative bills implicate rights establish the context, resources and insights necessary to integrate judicial norms into legislative decision-making. Nevertheless, governments appear willing to knowingly pursue legislation that is inconsistent with judicial norms, parliament’s power has not been fundamentally augmented to hold government to account for decisions that infringe upon rights, and party leaders do not accept that focusing on rights compliance is a useful tactic in their perpetual efforts to demonstrate why their party is the better alternative to government. In short, Westminster factors (such as executive dominance of parliament and strict party discipline continue) continue to function as the most influential forces driving legislative processes and political behavior.

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