Antitrust, algorithmic pricing and tacit collusion

Maurice E. Stucke; Ariel Ezrachi

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Chapter 24: Antitrust, algorithmic pricing and tacit collusion

Maurice E. Stucke

and

Ariel Ezrachi

Restricted access

Category:: Handbook Chapter

Published:: 28 Dec 2018

Page Range:: 624–648

Collection:: Law 2018

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786439055.00038

Restricted access

This chapter explores some of the means through which algorithms and artificial intelligence may be used to dampen competition. We note how algorithmic pricing could, under certain market conditions, lead to conscious parallelism and higher prices. We also identify some of the legal and enforcement challenges raised by algorithmic tacit collusion.

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Research Handbook on the Law of Artificial Intelligence

Edited by

Woodrow Barfield

and

Ugo Pagallo

Handbook

Published:: 28 Dec 2018

Print ISBN:: 9781786439048

eISBN:: 9781786439055

DOI:: https://doi.org/10.4337/9781786439055

Pages:: c 736

Collection:: Law 2018

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Front Matter

PART I: INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

PART II: REGULATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

PART III: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ISSUES

PART IV: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

PART V: APPLICATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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