Chapter 30: Jurisprudence and legal theory
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Traditional analytical philosophy has too frequently either ignored the work of legal realism or misunderstood it (though the realists have also been guilty of ignoring and misunderstanding analytical legal philosophy). There have, however, been some productive exchanges: realists pointing out how empirical work would strengthen and deepen traditional jurisprudential theories, and analytical theorists showing how analytical theories do, and should, ground the selection of empirical work. The present article offers an overview of those exchanges, focusing in particular on the works of H. L. A. Hart, Hanoch Dagan, and Brian Leiter.

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