Edited by Joshua C. Teitelbaum and Kathryn Zeiler
Chapter 3: Exclusionary vertical restraints and antitrust: experimental law and economics contributions
Vertical restraints have been the subject of lively policy and academic discussions. This chapter argues that experimental law and economics might strengthen the contributions of economic theories of vertical restrains to the design and implementation of antitrust institutions. First, experimental law and economics provides empirical evidence of the robustness of economic theories of antitrust. Second, the combination of economic theory and experimental work represents the application of scientific research methods. Third, experimental law and economics studies of antitrust involve the replication of complex and abstract economic theories using simple environments. These settings might facilitate policy-makers’ understanding of economic theories of antitrust. The chapter assesses the validity of claims regarding the contributions of experimental law and economics by investigating the methodological characteristics of seminal experimental work on vertical restraints and the outcomes produced by these studies.
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