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Towards a New Leadership in Global Investment Governance?
Edited by Julien Chaisse
Edited by Julien Chaisse
Edited by Yannick Radi
Dirk A. Zetzsche
The chapter begins by considering governance aspects of mutual funds in Ireland, a disproportionately important international jurisdiction for wealth management. It examines the variety of attributes that make Ireland an attractive domicile for funds and asset managers, including the country’s infrastructure, technology, and investment expertise, as well as its well-developed common law and legal system that provides parties with legal certainty. Ireland also offers a 12.5 percent corporate tax rate and no taxes on funds or investors. The chapter closes by considering the possible effects of Brexit arising from the large financial market across the Irish Sea.
Wulf A. Kaal
The growth of the hedge fund industry and the proliferation of retail alternative funds in combination with the fundamental reshaping of the regulatory landscape for the hedge fund industry suggest that mutual funds are becoming more like hedge funds as a matter of investment strategy while hedge funds are becoming more like mutual funds as a matter of regulatory framework. The chapter conceptualizes confluence as an emerging process and shows that confluence of mutual and hedge funds has implications for the evolution of the hedge fund industry, the governance of the mutual fund industry, the growth of the retail alternative fund market, and the structure of federal securities regulation.
Eric D. Roiter
The chapter conducts a comprehensive analysis of exchange-traded funds. Specifically, it explores the design of ETFs, traces their growth, and reviews their trading and investment strategies. It then considers the newest development in the world of ETFs, the advent of “actively managed” ETFs. Finally, it considers ETFs more broadly, to determine whether they pose a risk to the financial system that warrants greater regulation by the SEC and the Federal Reserve Board.
Deborah A. DeMott
The chapter considers the effect of the highly prescriptive regulatory structure of the Investment Company Act of 1940, focusing attention upon the contours of fiduciary duties in mutual funds. It advances the thesis that assessment of the role and significance of fiduciary obligations regarding investment funds, both mutual and private, turns on their distinctive characteristics, including those prescribed by regulation. It notes that the population of investment advisers now registered with the SEC includes many who advise at least one private fund, and their actions during the financial crisis suggest that advisers’ practices call into question whether they are acting consistently with their fiduciary duties.