Peter A.G. van Bergeijk
Klaus Hoeyer, Aaro Tupasela and Malene Bøgehus Rasmussen
In recent years, cross-national collaboration in medical research has gained increased policy attention. Policies are developed to enhance data sharing, ensure open access, and harmonize international standards and ethics rules in order to promote access to existing resources and increase scientific output. In tandem with this promotion of data sharing, numerous ethics policies are developed to control data flows and protect privacy and confidentiality. Both sets of policymaking, however, pay limited attention to the moral decisions and social ties enacted in the everyday routines of scientific work. This chapter takes its point of departure in the practices of a Danish laboratory with great experience in international collaboration regarding genetic research. We focus on a simple query: What makes genetic material and health data flow, and which hopes and concerns travel along with them? We explore what we call the flows, the nonflows, and the overflows of material and information, and we document the work producing the flows of health data and biomaterial. We call this work “ethics work” and argue that it is crucial for data sharing though it is rarely articulated in ethics policies, remains inadequately funded, and lacks acknowledgement in policies promoting international data sharing. The quest for Big Data is dependent on adequate maneuvering in local contexts and grand solutions of harmonization of ethics rules cannot replace the detailed ethics work aimed at acknowledging local concerns.
Blockchain is probably the most disruptive and revolutionary technology since the advent of the World Wide Web in the 1990s. Blockchain became known, above all, as the technology behind the bitcoin cryptocurrency. However, its potential still remains largely unexploited and according to experts, opportunities are almost ‘endless’, both in financial and non-financial sectors. Challenges and opportunities in this field vary greatly from person to person depending notably if they are researchers, practitioners or regulators. After a short introduction in order to place the analysis in its context, this chapter will focus on three selected opportunities, namely blockchain as a new payment method (cryptocurrency), as a new method for funding innovation (ICO/TGE) and as a new organizational structure (DAO); it will then focus on three selected challenges, namely regulatory, environmental and governance. The author then questions in a forward-looking manner whether blockchain may be seen as a gateway from the third to the fourth industrial/digital revolution.
Gianni Lo Schiavo
Like a latter-day Cinderella, the European Banking Union failed to make the original guest list when EMU formally began at Maastricht in 1992. Subsequently, however, the EBU went on to have its status transformed, gaining star billing. The significance of its belated creation has impressed scholars and participants alike. This article looks at the reasons for its initial exclusion, and the grounds for its then seemingly-inevitable subsequent eventual incorporation into the euro area structure in the form which it has taken. It also considers the elements which make the EBU: the Single Supervisory Mechanism, the Single Resolution Mechanism and the EBU's deposit insurance aspect. The future prospects of the EBU are then considered, and conclusions on the relationship between the EBU and EMU reached, with due regard being paid both to the need to update it and remain in step with broader international developments, and the need for its context to be accompanied by a Capital Markets Union.
Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson
Before we consider the future of ‘globalisation’ we must deﬁne its nature and outline its past. This is a complex and contested concept. If we take growing international interconnectedness – increasing ﬂows of trade, investment and communications between nations – to be what most people mean by the term, then ‘globalisation’ has been happening for the last 50 years. Moreover, new technologies – long distance jets, satellites, IT, ﬁbre optic cables – have made international travel, media and ﬁnancial exchanges far easier, enabling dramatic increases in trafﬁc volumes. The key questions are threefold. First, are these economic and social processes linking nations since 1945 unprecedented? Second, are these processes developing at the expense of state and national governance, that is, are national economies dissolving into a global marketplace and relations between states becoming secondary to more complex interactions between a variety of economic, social and political agencies? Third, is international economic interconnectedness set to increase or decrease?
Since the 1980s it had been fashionable to suggest that there was little that individual countries could do in the face of global economic forces, and any attempt to pursue independent policies would be doomed to failure. ‘Even China’, it was often said, was embracing the global free market. The idea that developing countries, such as India, could promote their own developmental interests by sheltering behind exchange controls or national planning had been swept away along with the Berlin Wall. In the globalized economy of the twenty-first century, it was argued, national governments had to go with the flow of global markets. As the 2008 international financial crisis was breaking, the global strategy firm Oxford Analytica held one of its usual daily analysis sessions, but open to those attending its annual conference. The chair briefly summarised the unfolding global crisis, and then went round the table asking the various national experts to report. Despite the consensus referred to above, the reports did not paint a picture of a uniform globalised market to which each country related in the same way. The US and UK had been referred to in the opening statement, being very much at the centre of whatever it was that had caused the worst economic crisis since the 1930s. But when the expert on Brazil was called, he reported that the socialist President Lula had kept its financial sector rather independent of the global markets. Next India, and here too it was reported that it actually hadn’t opened itself up to the global market quite as much as might have been thought. Then China, where, it was reported, the Communist Party had maintained rather a firm grip.