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Edited by Riccardo Viale, Shabnam Mousavi, Barbara Alemanni and Umberto Filotto
The chapter introduces some relevant neurocognitive topics on financial behaviour: the biases in financial predictions; the role of emotions in changing the weight of probability in financial risk assessment; the pragmatic aspect of communication in the financial market; the new neural discoveries about the phenomena of economic mirroring, imitation and free will; the emerging topic of organizational financial heuristics. Most of these data represent important knowledge to improve financial policy making and in particular to strengthen the new approach of behavioural policy making and regulation.
Gerald A. Epstein
Many observers thought that the financial crisis of 2007–08 would be a watershed moment in global finance. They believed the crisis would demonstrate, once and for all, the instability and inefficiency of this hyper-speculative global financial system, and finally bring an end to the destructive “neoliberal moment” and its “Washington Consensus” dictates in domestic and global economic policy (see, for example, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010). But, something surprising happened to “neoliberal financialization” on the way to the “dustbin of history”: it escaped. Financial deregulation and “neoliberal” populism in finance are in the ascendant in the United States and elsewhere, and the bankers are laughing, well. . .all the way to the bank.1 To be sure, there are important cracks in the old free market consensus on international financial issues. These cracks are leading to what Ilene Grabel (Chapter 5, in this volume) calls “productive incoherence” in theory and practice, which is leading to important opportunities for policy change in some areas. But, in many other areas, the old theories and practices are being resurrected after near-death experiences in the period following the crisis.
Edited by Gerald A. Epstein
Edited by Sabri Boubaker, Douglas Cumming and Duc K. Nguyen
Joseph R. Mason
While some have bemoaned CO2 markets’ performance due to low prices – that is, too low to deter emissions – a potentially bigger threat is that such markets develop to provide binding constraints arising not from market pricing but from non-fundamental factors like fraud and rent-seeking. Investor fraud, corporate fraud, and counterfeiting and theft are already well-known to these markets, with little in the way of specific oversight and protection. If we are to expect meaningful market development, it makes sense to insulate such markets rent-seeking, generally, including various forms of fraud, counterfeiting, and permit theft that have already manifested in the sector. Only by restraining such influences can we provide a smooth-functioning CO2 market that can be the basis of economic growth, without exposing the broader economy to the potential for commodity market panics and crashes.