Edited by Justine Lloyd and Ellie Vasta
Chapter 1 examines the history of the distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts. It shows how states have insisted on the distinction between internal wars and international wars since the origins of international humanitarian law. It further argues that the law of Non-International Armed Conflict is based on states’ willingness to extend humanitarian protection to internal wars without hampering their right to quell rebellions and to treat rebels as criminals under their domestic law.
Edited by Paulo A.L.D. Nunes, Lisa E. Svensson and Anil Markandya
Susana C. Santos, Craig Mitchell, Hans Landström, Alain Fayolle and António Caetano
Richard M. Salsman
Not until the Enlightenment and the financial revolution in the eighteenth century did sovereigns borrow publicly, regularly, and responsibly. Constitutionalism, the rule of law, ethical acceptance of lending, and more respect for sanctity of contract increased creditors’ willingness to lend. Three centuries of data show that public leverage – the ratio of public debt to GDP – was highest at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and World War II. Public leverage since 1980 has increased steadily for many sovereigns, but for most of them leverage is still far below prior peaks. The multi-decade rise in public leverage reflects burgeoning welfare states but also coincides with an anomalous decline in public borrowing costs, due mainly to repressive central bank policies.