The ECtHR's Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Al-Khawaja and Tahery initiated a tremendous amount of literature appertaining to the question of the extent to which the accused's right to confrontation can be limited. A large number of scholars commented on the implications for the rights of the accused, including recommendations that the Court should focus more on the underlying principles for the restriction of this right. This article will leave the latter questions aside and concentrate on a more practical issue by comparing the doctrinal nuances of Strasbourg's Grand Chamber judgment—which are regarded as a convergence of common and civil law traditions—with cases in other regional human rights jurisdictions, i.e. the UN Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Is the right to confrontation restricted more, or perhaps less, in other jurisdictions and is there a clear line? This article provides the reader with the necessary background information on the new doctrinal elements on the restrictions of the right to confrontation, which have been established by Strasbourg's Grand Chamber. It then uses these elements such as ‘necessity’ and ‘counterbalance’ and scrutinises cases of other human rights jurisdictions under these lenses. The results will show whether or not other human rights bodies would have decided differently if they had used the ECtHR's yardstick for their decisions.
This article seeks to determine if there is a fundamental right of states to be free from economic coercion, against the background of international law permitting economic coercion as a means for its own implementation. After defining coercion and other cognate terms, the article surveys the limits to (economic) countermeasures and (economic) sanctions, and determines that any ‘sphere of economic freedom’ of states is essentially a relative concept, without an irreducible core. Public international law does not currently establish a fundamental right of states to be free from economic coercion—though one should probably be established.
Mohamad Ghazi Janaby and Khaled Ramadan Bashir
Rosmarijn van Kleef
International and national sports federations create, apply and enforce rules in order to regulate their sports. If an associated member or club does not comply with these rules, disciplinary sanctions—such as fines, exclusion from participation in certain matches, or even exclusion from the federation—can be imposed. From the outset, the national or international sports federations create their own regulations and enforce them through an internal—private—sanctioning system. However, in the review of the sanction, national law takes up a prominent place. A federation's decision to impose a sanction can be subject to review either by a national court or in arbitration, for example, before the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The arbitral award, whose goal is to reach a final decision, can nevertheless be challenged before a national court. In the review of disciplinary sanctions, different legal frameworks—the private rules of sports federations and national law—cross each other's paths. The aim of this article is to map out the interrelation between these frameworks by analysing the two different paths that exist for the review of a disciplinary sanction. As the regulation of sport naturally crosses national borders, this analysis is structured using a comparative approach to find out whether there is any coherence at the international level regarding the review of disciplinary sanctions. The countries included in the comparison are England, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.
The relationship of Iraqi Kurdistan to the Iraqi federal polity and the outside world challenges some of the standard assumptions in international law and international relations theory about statehood and de jure recognition. The Iraqi Kurdish model–building a de facto state first, and seeking international recognition later–provides an interesting counterpoint to the standard model and, for example, the Palestinian approach, which has focussed on international recognition before practical statecraft. The importance of international recognition in the current crisis involving the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, however, demonstrates that de jure recognition in the international community of states is still essential, and that ‘sovereign’ status likely remains the goal state desired by sub-national communities such as the Iraqi Kurds.
Professor John Bell delivered an abbreviated version of these remarks as the Closing Address to the Third Annual CJICL Conference on Sunday, 11 May 2014 at the Divinity School of St John's College in the University of Cambridge. In them, Professor Bell addresses the assumption of the unifying force of universality and cosmopolitanism and how the citation of foreign laws by national judges affects the validity of such an assumption from the point of view of legal research.
The Report of the Parker Committee, formed in 1916 to consider potential reforms to patent law, was not published. It was concerned, in part, with the abuse of the British patent system by foreigners, proposing significant reforms to address the perceived issues. Ultimately, its proposals were the basis of the failed Patents and Designs Bill 1917. Significantly, the Committee considered issues around compulsory licences, licences of right and the patenting of medicinal products (that is, pharmaceuticals). The public records do not include a copy of the final report or all the key memoranda from which the Committee started its work. These are brought together here for the first time.
In the US, federal antitrust law may come into conflict both with federal regulation and regulatory schemes enacted by individual states. Similarly, in the EU, tensions can arise between EU antitrust rules, on the one hand, and either EU or member states' regulation, on the other. This paper seeks to examine the role played by legal tradition, in its manifold dimensions, in shaping the relationship between antitrust and regulation on the two sides of the Atlantic. To this end, Sections 2 and 3 will analyse the statutory provisions and doctrines governing the interplay between antitrust and regulation in the US and the EU. Sections 4 and 5 will explore each jurisdiction's legal traditions that may be relevant to the relationship between antitrust and regulation, such as the constitutional and political context of antitrust policy, the role of legal scholarship, and the antitrust enforcement culture. Section 6 will investigate possible connections between the divergences in the antitrust-regulation interface in the two legal systems and their different legal traditions.
Much ink has been spilled over the Republic of Somalia. Somaliland became synonymous for pariah state and was in the spotlight and in the immediate interest of international organisations and intergovernmental bodies due to the continuous deadlock and unsolvable political turmoil. Quite recently, the country attracted the interest of the international community as a new Constitution was adopted, and thus the Republic of Somalia joined the club of numerous African countries, such as Tunisia, Egypt, South Sudan, and Libya with a new constitutional order. The Constitution was adopted with the aim of terminating a long period of tensions, warfare, political turmoil, and often chaos, by establishing efficient political institutions and introducing governance that is more responsive and accountable to its people. In this Note, I review and evaluate the Somali Constitution, while the aim is to provide an overview of the role of the constitutional drafting process and the new constitution in the political era of the post conflict Somalia. The analysis begins by considering the recent political environment of Somaliland, and the whole process that led to the new Constitution. This will be followed by a detailed discussion about the major components of the Constitution, elaborating on the architecture of the polity. Finally, the last part will be devoted to an attempt to highlight the benefits and the deficits of the new constitution.