This chapter talks about the invention of economics from a historical and methodological perspective, highlighting both its diversity and its place within political philosophy. It analyzes the victory of the neoclassical over other economic schools and how it came about by examining its building blocks. The latter, in turn, allows for an analysis of the concept of economics imperialism, and, with it, how law and economics came to dominate corporate governance with agency theory.
Gustavo Ghidini and Giovanni Cavani
The aim of this paper is to define the scope of protection afforded to ‘marks with reputation’ under EU Directives and Regulations. The authors argue that the protection granted to said marks also in relation to ‘not similar’ goods requires that, having regard to all the circumstances of the specific case, the consumer could be induced to reasonably suppose that the trade mark owner is somehow (industrially or commercially) connected with the circulation of products bearing an identical or confusingly similar sign. If this possibility cannot be assessed, it should be denied that the use of that sign either brings an unfair advantage to the third party user, or is detrimental to the distinctive character or the repute of the renowned trade mark. In sum, the thesis here submitted states that the protection afforded to renowned trade marks, even ‘extra moenia’ (ie beyond the risk of confusion in a strict sense between the products), anyway presupposes that a misleading message is conveyed to the consumer, inducing her/him to ‘transfer’ the reputation of the latter's products to those of the third party user's products, with the effect of altering the consumer's purchasing choices.
Edited by Johanna Gibson
Fernando J. Cardim de Carvalho
Much of the criticism directed at austerity programs implemented after the 2007/2008 financial crisis, more forcefully in the eurozone, have relied on the same arguments Keynes and others raised against the (British) Treasury View developed in the 1920s and 1930s. Austerity, however, has been proposed most insistently in the 2010s by European authorities, led by the German Federal Ministry of Finance, the Bundesfinanzministerium (BMF). While the arguments for austerity then and now share some common elements, there are enough original arguments being presented by the BMF to make many of the criticisms ineffective. The paper reconstructs both views, the Treasury's and the BMF's, to show and evaluate their similarities and their differences.
Why are investment companies are regulated so differently from every other kind of company? The multitude of other companies across our diverse spectrum of business endeavors—from software design to clothing retail to food service, and so forth—are regulated by a generic body of securities regulations. What exactly makes an investment company so different from every other kind of company that it alone deserves special securities regulation? The chapter concludes that, whatever the historical rationales for investment company regulation, the most compelling rationale for investment company regulation today is an investment company’s unique organizational structure. An investment fund almost always has a separate legal existence and a separate set of owners from the managers who control it. A fund investor thus relates to her managers in a radically different way from an investor in every other kind of company.