As in Gogol’s quote, the arrival of a government inspector still elicits instant fear and worry in a number of countries – including Russia, and most of the former Soviet Union. Most of these inspectors nowadays, by contrast with Gogol’s, come to inspect and control not state institutions, but private ones, particularly businesses. ‘Inspectors’ and ‘inspections’ come under different names – ‘control’, ‘surveillance’, ‘supervision’ – so the notion may require ‘translation’ into the appropriate words for each country. The reality, however, in most parts of the world, is that inspections (under whichever name) are one of the most frequent and important ways in which businesses interact with state authorities. While scholars and governments often look at ‘regulations’ in an abstract way, businesses will typically relate more to their actual experience of regulations, which arises through procedures such as permits and licences, and through inspections – particularly if the latter are frequent, burdensome or otherwise problematic. This is not unique to regulations affecting businesses, and for most citizens ‘laws’ likewise are often distant abstractions, and are experienced primarily through concrete processes: obtaining documents, marrying or inheriting, and of course dealing with the police. Just as inspections can be seen as essential and beneficial, or as burdensome and inadequate, the police are to some an indispensable defensive wall against crime, to others a body that oppresses some citizens regardless of what they have done. Inspections and other enforcement practices are thus inherently ambiguous. Inspections and control are absolutely necessary for some, oppressive and hostile for others.
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Christopher May and Adam Winchester
Hossein Nabilou and Alessio M. Pacces
This chapter deals with the economic rationale for regulating shadow banking. It discusses whether the regulatory initiatives proposed by academics and policymakers are consistent with this rationale. We posit that the ultimate goal of financial regulation is to promote financial stability. Therefore, we evaluate shadow banking regulation based on its ability to reduce financial instability efficiently. Regulating shadow banking is challenging because shadow banking is often defined by reference to what it is not, namely, licensed or official banking. However, such an approach does not capture the essence of the shadow banking problem. The official banking system has implicitly or explicitly supported a significant part of what is known today as shadow banking. For instance, the asset backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits or the structured investment vehicles (SIV), which were exposed to the United States (US) housing market during the global financial crisis (GFC), all enjoyed guarantees by banks – so-called ‘put options’ – by way of contract or reputation. The remainder of shadow banking was still problematic for financial stability because of the contracts in which shadow banks were counterparty to banks. American International Group (AIG), for instance, was counterparty to a significant part of the banking system relying on credit default swaps (CDS) to insure against the default of mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
Chapter 1 introduces the phenomenon of outsourced law, which is characterised by the imposition of goals, while leaving it to the addressees to devise the means by which these goals can be achieved. It is argued that the kind of regulation that is developed in this way should not be regarded as separate from formal law. Law and regulation are different and interconnected styles of guiding human behaviour. In order to analyse and contrast these styles a philosophical perspective is called for. Law and regulation should be studied as normative orders with a dynamic of their own; they are not just steering instruments. Outsourced law will be studied by analysing the types of rules that are produced as well as the way people actually use these products, by analysing underlying aspirations and by examining the many intended or unintended changes that are brought about by the adoption of that style.
Iris H.-Y. Chiu and Iain G. MacNeil
‘Shadow banking’ refers to a range of activities that have bank-like character, that is, credit intermediation, liquidity and maturity transformation, and that are undertaken outside the regulated banking system. This can mean activities carried out by non-bank entities that mimic bank-like activities, but can also refer to activities carried out by banks and other regulated firms that do not always operate within the established fabric of regulation they are subject to. Although such activities may be seen as a form of financial innovation, the relationship between innovation and regulatory arbitrage remains uneasy. The former is often viewed more positively than the latter, although it is clear from history that the former has often driven the latter (for example, the emergence of the Eurobond market). The Financial Stability Board (FSB) has provided leadership in developing international surveys of shadow banking activity around the world and policy thinking to govern these areas. In 2013, the FSB set out in a policy document the need to consider how shadow banking activity affects financial stability, but its focus was inevitably on known areas whose risks have played out in the global financial crisis of 2007–09. The spotlight on these areas has nevertheless led to regulatory reforms in many parts of the world, discussions of which are canvassed in this volume, but issues remain outstanding in relation to the effectiveness and scope of reforms.
Malgorzata A. Carran
‘My mum keeps crying but my dad will not ask for help, he says he doesn’t need it’ (17, female) The terms gambling-related harm and vulnerability to such harms are too frequently referred to with the implicit assumption that their meaning is understood consistently and their scope readily agreed upon. Yet, they represent a social construct with often fluid boundaries that is influenced and shaped by political and cultural discourses. This chapter exposes how the UK’s regulatory framework adopts, in substance, a narrow understanding of these two interrelated concepts that emphasises individual pathology at the expense of taking a wider and equal view of all the agents of vulnerability and all the dimensions of gambling-related harm. This, in turn, leads to an imbalance in what social responsibility initiatives become the focus of regulation, which, on the whole, marginalises those who may find themselves in the highest need of social protection.