The issue of barriers to exit has been neglected by competition authorities and by competition policy research. This is somewhat surprising as it is a topic which goes to the heart of why competition policy exists; if barriers to exit prevent or delay inefficient firms from leaving the market, then the normal competitive process of driving up market efficiency is hampered. This in turn reduces the benefits to other, more efficient firms, and to customers in terms of lower prices, better quality, etc. This article explores the reasons why, despite the importance of barriers to exit in the economic framework that underpins competition policy, very few competition authority decisions discuss the issue. It considers the approach to barriers to exit in different types of competition investigation, such as merger assessment, Article 101 and 102 TFEU cases, and State aid. The article also considers the scope for cross-disciplinary research and collaboration, such as in the design of insolvency or bankruptcy laws.
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Edited by Sabine Corneloup
Study of the human anatomy, quite clearly, starts with an analysis of the body as a whole. It is not possible to conjecture what lies within a body if there is no understanding of the overall body being studied. Insofar as the Human Rights Council is concerned, this will be done succinctly based on an overall description of the Council and its main mechanisms. The aim of this chapter is to offer some general considerations that are necessary to understand their main features. The Human Rights Council (The Council) was established by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly (The Assembly) in its Resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 to replace the Commission on Human Rights (The Commission). Its status, which is supposed to be reviewed on a regular basis, is that of a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.