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Javier Reyes

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Javier Reyes

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Alexander Styhre

Chapter 1 introduces governance as a legal issue, ultimately grounded in the philosophy of right, a branch of philosophy. Early legal theorists such as Hugo Grotius sketched versions of what is today called governance, and there is today a line of demarcation drawn between liberal economies of the Anglo-American type, and continental and Scandinavian embedded economies wherein the state is recognized as a major agent influencing the economic system. The chapter discusses the differences between John Locke’s liberal view of, e.g., ownership rights, and George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s philosophy of right, developed 14 decades later. Whereas Locke emphasizes a “minimal theory” of ownership rights, serving as the foundation for liberalism, Hegel too recognizes ownership as a fundamental right but locates ownership rights within the realm of the state. Consequently, the intellectual roots of liberal economies and embedded economies share certain assumptions but also diverge regarding assumptions about the role of the state. The second half of the chapter examines the creation of the Berle–Means firm, a key legal vehicle in the liberal economy and in its governance.

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Alexander Styhre

This chapter introduces the concept of governance as a key term when examining the current economic situation, including growing economic inequality. In order to understand such an economic and social phenomenon, analytical terms that bridge public companies, state-controlled agencies, and transnational regulators need to be introduced. The chapter introduces and critically discusses key terms in the governance literature, including corporate governance, transnational governance, and related terms such as accountability.

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Alexander Styhre

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Edited by Sabri Boubaker, Douglas Cumming and Duc K. Nguyen

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Joseph R. Mason

While some have bemoaned CO2 markets’ performance due to low prices – that is, too low to deter emissions – a potentially bigger threat is that such markets develop to provide binding constraints arising not from market pricing but from non-fundamental factors like fraud and rent-seeking. Investor fraud, corporate fraud, and counterfeiting and theft are already well-known to these markets, with little in the way of specific oversight and protection. If we are to expect meaningful market development, it makes sense to insulate such markets rent-seeking, generally, including various forms of fraud, counterfeiting, and permit theft that have already manifested in the sector. Only by restraining such influences can we provide a smooth-functioning CO2 market that can be the basis of economic growth, without exposing the broader economy to the potential for commodity market panics and crashes.

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Edited by Sabri Boubaker, Douglas Cumming and Duc K. Nguyen

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Edited by Sabri Boubaker, Douglas Cumming and Duc K. Nguyen

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Shawn Pope

Theorists have given strategic and political reasons to expect a relationship from advertising to CSR. Contrary to these expectations, the nearly 30 studies that have tested the relationship from advertising to CSR have yielded evidence that is surprisingly weak. The chapter systematically reviews this literature and conducts its own international panel study. The present findings also suggest the absence of a strong, robust link from advertising to CSR. In a concluding section, this chapter discusses the findings in light of other recent studies of CSR advertising and of CSR adoption motivations.