Browse by title

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 346 items :

  • Political Economy x
  • All accessible content x
Clear All
This content is available to you

Edited by Gerald A. Epstein

This content is available to you

Gerald A. Epstein

Many observers thought that the financial crisis of 2007–08 would be a watershed moment in global finance. They believed the crisis would demonstrate, once and for all, the instability and inefficiency of this hyper-speculative global financial system, and finally bring an end to the destructive “neoliberal moment” and its “Washington Consensus” dictates in domestic and global economic policy (see, for example, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro, 2010). But, something surprising happened to “neoliberal financialization” on the way to the “dustbin of history”: it escaped. Financial deregulation and “neoliberal” populism in finance are in the ascendant in the United States and elsewhere, and the bankers are laughing, well. . .all the way to the bank.1 To be sure, there are important cracks in the old free market consensus on international financial issues. These cracks are leading to what Ilene Grabel (Chapter 5, in this volume) calls “productive incoherence” in theory and practice, which is leading to important opportunities for policy change in some areas. But, in many other areas, the old theories and practices are being resurrected after near-death experiences in the period following the crisis.

This content is available to you

Colin Turner

This content is available to you

David Kaufmann

This content is available to you

Mats Benner

This content is available to you

Jane D’Arista

This content is available to you

Peter A.G van Bergeijk and Selwyn J.V. Moons

Peter A.G. van Bergeijk and Selwyn Moons discuss the emergence of the concept of economic diplomacy in the fields of Accounting, Business Economics, Conflict Studies, Development Studies, International Economics, International Relations, International Trade, Management Science, Peace Science, Political Science and Public Finance. The focus should be on bilateral activities such as nation branding, trade missions, trade fairs and network activities of embassies and consulates and the impact of these tools on import, export and Foreign Direct Investment. The field should extend beyond the traditional boundaries of commercial diplomacy and business diplomacy and also cover the not-for-profit-sector, including universities and other knowledge institutes, the health sector, the cultural sector, NGO’s etc. One key finding for research is the need to consider significant heterogeneities with respect to (the efficacy of) instruments, countries, institutions levels of development and behavior and decision-making of firms.

This content is available to you

Edited by Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner

This content is available to you

Theocharis Grigoriadis

There are strong linkages between religion, bureaucratic organization, citizen preferences, and political regimes. The views of Lipset and Rokkan, Marx, Lukacs, Marcuse, Adorno, Weber, and Durkheim are discussed. The choice of these thinkers relates to the three grand themes that are discussed in the book: (1) The linkage between religion and political regimes in terms of social welfare expectations by the electorate, surveillance incentives, and collectivist distribution by bureaucrats; (2) The religious traditions that shape the administrative structures of local or regional communities; and (3) The different levels of policy discretion, administrative monitoring, and centralization that correspond to different sets of religious norms adopted by citizens and bureaucrats. The critique of conventional social theory treats religion in its key dimensions: as state structure, party cleavage, and social welfare.

This content is available to you

Giuseppe Eusepi and Richard E. Wagner

Antonio de Viti de Marco, accepted David Ricardo’s proposition that an extraordinary tax and a public loan are equivalent. All the same, de Viti’s theory of public debt diverged sharply from Ricardo’s. Ricardo thought effectively in representative agent terms; De Viti did not, and thought instead of macro variables as emerging out of interaction among individuals. Ricardo’s macro framework entailed the self-extinction of public debt due to its representative agent quality. In contrast, de Viti’s micro framework explained that self-extinction depended on the operating properties of the political system in which public debt was generated. Within the theoretical extremum of a system of cooperative democracy, self-extinction was a likely property. Ordinary democratic systems, however, featured continuing competition among elites striving for power. This competition enabled politically dominant groups to pass cost onto others in society, bringing about a de facto form of debt default and not self-extinction.