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Edited by Pier L. Parcu, Giorgio Monti and Marco Botta

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Pier Luigi Parcu, Giorgio Monti and Marco Botta

A long time has passed since Advocate General (AG) Geelhoed stated in his Opinion in Manfredi that ‘private enforcement of (competition law) in Europe is still in its infancy’. One decade after the landmark ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the number of antitrust claims in national civil courts has steadily increased, though major differences exist among the EU Member States. In particular, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands have become the preferred fora by claimants in cross-border actions, while the majority of the other Member States have not recorded many antitrust damages cases. In term of remedies, however, claimants often request either injunctive relief or contract invalidation, rather than damages. Finally, industrial customers, rather than final consumers, start most of the legal actions, even in the countries where private enforcement of EU competition law is more developed. During the past decade, the EU Commission has actively promoted damages actions for breaches of EU competition rules. During this period of time, the pendulum of the policy discourse followed by the EU executive branch has swung between the goal of increasing the number of damages claims in national courts on the one hand, and the idea of establishing a level playing field among the EU Member States in terms of applicable procedural rules, in order to discourage forum shopping on the other. In the initial 2005 Green Paper, the EU Commission emphasized that damages actions should ‘deter’ competition law violations.

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EXTENDED TABLE OF CONTENTS

Law and Practice, Second Edition

David Ashton

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EXTENDED TABLE OF CONTENTS

A Case Commentary, Second Edition

Edited by Weijer VerLoren van Themaat and Berend Reuder

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ARTICLE 3 TEU

A Case Commentary, Second Edition

Edited by Weijer VerLoren van Themaat and Berend Reuder

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Edited by François-Charles Laprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco De Cecco

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Edited by François-Charles Laprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco De Cecco

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Ioannis Kokkoris

This chapter analyses the special nature of banks, and how the importance of the banking sector and its stability overlaps with the preservation of competitive banking markets. Banks have a unique standing in the economy, and are regarded as more vulnerable to instability than other firms as they provide liquidity and are involved in inter-bank lending markets and the payment system. Due to the systemic nature of banks, governments try to avert a crisis that can affect the whole banking sector by ensuring that banks which are ‘too big to fail’ remain sustainable. Such intervention has a distortive effect on competition, as it prevents ‘self-correction’ of the market. State aid measures that characterized the response of regulators in the recent financial crisis were based on the premise of the special nature of the banking sector and its importance to the economy. In addressing the special nature of banks the chapter looks into the approach adopted towards banks under State aid control, tackling issues such as ‘too-big-to-fail’ and the BRRD and SRM.

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Edited by François-Charles Laprévote, Joanna Gray and Francesco De Cecco

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Peter C. Carstensen

This chapter describes the harms that abuse of buyer power causes including both exploitation of producers and exclusion of competing buyers. It highlights the global dimensions of the problems that abuse of buyer power is causing.