Commission inspections pursuant to Article 20(4) of Regulation 1/2003 (i.e. dawn raids) interfere with the privacy rights of companies and individuals. This interference is disproportionate when it is not consistent with the requirements laid down in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 8 of the European Convention for Human Rights. In its recent judgments in the French Supermarkets cases, the General Court partially annulled four Commission inspection decisions for constituting an arbitrary and unjustified interference with the privacy rights of the inspected companies. The General Court found that the Commission had initiated inspections without having sufficiently serious evidence in its possession. This article examines this finding of the General Court and its practical implications for the protection of companies’ privacy rights in the context of dawn raids. In addition, this article examines possible remedies for challenging the seizure and copying of documents containing personal information of raided companies’ staff during a dawn raid.
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Nima Lorjé and Ariela Stoffer
2019 has seen loot boxes remain a prime target of concern for regulators, legislators and industry bodies alike, yet despite the work carried out in the Gambling Regulators European Forum in this regard, there have been no substantial efforts to develop a common EU response to date. This article aims to argue that such inaction at a European level is unsatisfactory from both the perspective of the European consumer and games companies alike, while highlighting that any broad regulatory attempts to limit loot boxes to date should be viewed with scepticism.
Having examined the three main approaches that could form the basis of a common EU response (gambling law, self-regulation and consumer law) that could deal with some of the issues that national fragmentation in the field have presented to date, it is submitted that a hybrid system, which draws together principles from these three main approaches, can strike the right level of balance between protecting innovative monetization systems for developers, whilst safeguarding consumers from practices deemed to be ‘predatory’.
Gaetano Dimita, Jon Festinger, Yin Harn Lee, Michaela MacDonald and Marc Mimler
Reem Anwar Ahmed Raslan
The transfer of technology has been mainly subject to the North-South dichotomy where the North is regarded as the principal source of technical knowledge to the South. Nevertheless, as new economic powers emerge in the South, the scene of international technology transfer is changing rapidly. Many South-South endeavors on transfer of technology are on the rise. Thus, a new model of transfer of technology is gaining momentum, in particular the South-South Model of transfer of technology. This paper aims to look at this issue by attempting to answer the following questions: How did South-South cooperation in the field of transfer of technology evolve? How did the rise of the South affect the North-South conflict in the context of transfer of technology? What is the impact of the South-South cooperation in the field of technology transfer on the North?
James Crawford, Andrew Sanger, Rumiana Yotova, So Yeon Kim and Tom Boekestein
The 2018 Fisheries White Paper and the Fisheries Act 2020 were designed to govern United Kingdom (UK) fisheries management in the post-Brexit era irrespective of whether the UK and the European Union (EU) succeeded in settling their differences on fisheries and other matters that for much of 2020 made it uncertain whether the Trade and Cooperation Agreement could be concluded. This article considers several international legal issues raised by the White Paper and Fisheries Act, including the choices made by the UK as to which regional fisheries management organisations to (re)join now that the EU no longer speaks for the UK within them, and the treaty processes for doing so, before moving on to further matters given only sketchy treatment in, or omitted altogether from, those documents, on which a firmer position ought to have been taken. Lastly, a new problem apparent for the first time in the Fisheries Act is discussed: navigational freedom of foreign fishing vessels in the UK's exclusive economic zone, and a missed opportunity to legislate a related evidential presumption that would assist future prosecutions for illegal fishing.
The introduction of statutory awards for inventors in the Patents Act 1977 was highly controversial. Using original archival sources and parliamentary debates, the political battles that raged both in public and behind the scenes are explored. Central to the policy development was a report by a government-appointed Working Party; yet, until now, this report and its recommendations have not been published. The report represents a compromise agreement between representatives of both employers and employees. It was used by the government as the main defence of its policy. Using this report, and the contemporary political discussions, the small number of decisions of the comptroller and the courts will be examined to see if they reflect the balance struck by the Working Party, thereby providing a history of statutory employee awards in the United Kingdom as they have evolved over the last fifty years.
Nick Dadson, Iain Snoddy and Joshua White
‘Big data’ and ‘big tech’ have become central topics in recent antitrust debate and regulation. For example, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) recently published a report on online platforms, expressing concerns that the major platforms like Google are now protected from competition by such strong incumbency advantages. Underlying the CMA's theory of harm is the essential facility theory of antitrust, under which Google's ability to control access to its click-and-query data is seen as preventing its rivals from competing effectively. EU jurisprudence has identified three criteria to determine whether data are an essential facility and whether access should be mandated. First, the data must be indispensable to compete in the market. Secondly, absent data sharing, technical improvements by competitors must be hampered or precluded. Thirdly, there must be no objective justification to refuse competitors access to the data. It is difficult to reconcile the authorities’ concerns with Google's click-and-query data with these criteria, however. Actual and potential alternatives exist; Google's competitors have been innovating in the search market for more than a decade; and there are objective reasons to limit data access, including threats to innovation and privacy concerns.