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Dhammika Dharmapala

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Edited by Brigitte Unger, Daan van der Linde and Michael Getzner

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Brigitte Unger, Loek Groot and Daan van der Linde

This introduction aims to provide a framework to address not only the normative question on what ought to be the character and business of government (or any other public authority), but also to positively evaluate shifts between private and public roles in recent history. Historical evaluations of the balance between market, state and society may serve as an alternative for models arguing that the ‘right’ configuration exists: why did current tasks evolve the way they did, and what can be learned from the past? Changes in technology or in the economic environment (such as the emergence of the European Union and globalization) can be held responsible for shifts in the optimal allocation between the public and private sphere, but there might also be a major shift of preferences regarding what should be public or private. Although it is hard to claim that the pendulum in the division between public and private, or market and government, has begun to reverse its swing, we feel it is important to give an account of the public sector in order to better understand what is at stake.

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Richard M. Salsman

Not until the Enlightenment and the financial revolution in the eighteenth century did sovereigns borrow publicly, regularly, and responsibly. Constitutionalism, the rule of law, ethical acceptance of lending, and more respect for sanctity of contract increased creditors’ willingness to lend. Three centuries of data show that public leverage – the ratio of public debt to GDP – was highest at the end of the Napoleonic Wars and World War II. Public leverage since 1980 has increased steadily for many sovereigns, but for most of them leverage is still far below prior peaks. The multi-decade rise in public leverage reflects burgeoning welfare states but also coincides with an anomalous decline in public borrowing costs, due mainly to repressive central bank policies.

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Richard Eccleston, Richard Krever and Helen Smith

This chapter establishes the conceptual and theoretical foundations for the ensuing volume. It summarizes the debates concerning the key features of federal governance before providing an overview of the existing explanations of change in federal systems, with a particular emphasis on the application of new institutionalism to explanations of ‘federal dynamics’. The second section of the chapter focuses on the literature on the impact of financial and economic crises of federal governance before providing an empirical account of the economic impact of the 2008–9 financial crisis on the 12 cases included within the volume. The chapter concludes by outlining how an actor-centred institutionalism is applied to the case studies that follow.
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Gordon Rausser, Holly Amedon and Reid Stevens

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Gordon Rausser, Holly Amedon and Reid Stevens

Despite fostering US productivity growth, public sector contributions to university research budgets have steadily declined over the last few decades. As a result, the need to actively seek alternative sources of funding has become increasingly imperative. Private industry frequently offers a viable alternative, now accounting for over 70 percent of national research and development budgets, not only because of its financial resources but because of the dramatic synergies of knowledge assets that arise from successful alliances with universities. Fostering the formation of public–private research partnerships (PPRPs), legislation emerging from the US Senate in the form of the Bayh–Dole Act granted patent rights from federally funded research to universities and small businesses. This legislation created incentives for universities to select areas of research that are likely to result in commercially valuable innovations. The task of PPRP formation is complex and delicate, with many contentious issues arising such as conflict of public and private interests, setting research priorities, ownership and access to intellectual property, and academic researcher publication delays. At the center of the PPRP controversy is the absence of a framework for structuring research agreements and for assessing the inherent merit of such contracts. We present a four-stage framework for analyzing the structure of contracts for PPRPs, recognizing that the essence of PPRPs is a set of “control rights” rooted in incomplete contracting and financial control rights theory. Our framework shows how control rights can be effectively identified, valued, and allotted between research partners.

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  • Elgar Research Reviews in Economics

James Alm and J. Sebastian Leguizamon

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Colin C. Williams and Friedrich Schneider