A History of American State and Local Economic Development: As Two Ships Pass in the Night presents a three-part history of American state and local economic development since 1789. Part I concentrates on economic development from colonial times thru 1929. Part II deals with a transition era that starts with the Depression/New Deal and proceeds through Eisenhower (1961). Part III lays the foundation for twenty-first-century contemporary economic development focusing primarily thru the 1990s. Chapter 1 argues the need for, and value of, a history of American economic development as a “bottom-up” jurisdictional public policy perspective that views economic development strategy, tools, and programs as outputs of a jurisdictional policy system. The policy system rests on the jurisdictional political culture which shapes but does not determine its outputs. American economic development has displayed through its history the existence of two macro-political cultures: progressivism and privatism—these are the Two Ships. Each culture forged its own “style” or approach to economic development: mainstream/classic economic development (privatism) and community development (progressivism). The Chapter 1 model provides a framework for the history. That framework includes: characteristics of the profession (“onionization,” siloization, and bifurcation); the three drivers of economic development policy (industry/sector profit cycle, population mobility, and competitive hierarchies); and outputs which can be strategies, tools, and programs delivered by economic development organizations (EDOs) constructed, tasked, and empowered to respond to issues and problems generated in the course of the history. In particular, structural types such as “hybrid public–private,” jurisdictional lead agency, and specialized EDOs are key players in jurisdictional policy systems.
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Ronald W. Coan
Edited by Brigitte Unger, Daan van der Linde and Michael Getzner
Brigitte Unger, Loek Groot and Daan van der Linde
This introduction aims to provide a framework to address not only the normative question on what ought to be the character and business of government (or any other public authority), but also to positively evaluate shifts between private and public roles in recent history. Historical evaluations of the balance between market, state and society may serve as an alternative for models arguing that the ‘right’ configuration exists: why did current tasks evolve the way they did, and what can be learned from the past? Changes in technology or in the economic environment (such as the emergence of the European Union and globalization) can be held responsible for shifts in the optimal allocation between the public and private sphere, but there might also be a major shift of preferences regarding what should be public or private. Although it is hard to claim that the pendulum in the division between public and private, or market and government, has begun to reverse its swing, we feel it is important to give an account of the public sector in order to better understand what is at stake.
Richard Eccleston, Rob Hortle and Richard Krever
Richard Eccleston, Richard Krever and Helen Smith
Robert W. Kolb
David E. McNabb
Gordon Rausser, Holly Amedon and Reid Stevens
Gordon Rausser, Holly Amedon and Reid Stevens
Despite fostering US productivity growth, public sector contributions to university research budgets have steadily declined over the last few decades. As a result, the need to actively seek alternative sources of funding has become increasingly imperative. Private industry frequently offers a viable alternative, now accounting for over 70 percent of national research and development budgets, not only because of its financial resources but because of the dramatic synergies of knowledge assets that arise from successful alliances with universities. Fostering the formation of public–private research partnerships (PPRPs), legislation emerging from the US Senate in the form of the Bayh–Dole Act granted patent rights from federally funded research to universities and small businesses. This legislation created incentives for universities to select areas of research that are likely to result in commercially valuable innovations. The task of PPRP formation is complex and delicate, with many contentious issues arising such as conflict of public and private interests, setting research priorities, ownership and access to intellectual property, and academic researcher publication delays. At the center of the PPRP controversy is the absence of a framework for structuring research agreements and for assessing the inherent merit of such contracts. We present a four-stage framework for analyzing the structure of contracts for PPRPs, recognizing that the essence of PPRPs is a set of “control rights” rooted in incomplete contracting and financial control rights theory. Our framework shows how control rights can be effectively identified, valued, and allotted between research partners.