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Plácido Rodríguez, Brad R. Humphreys and Robert Simmons

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Brad R. Humphreys, Jane E. Ruseski and Jie Yang

The question of the extent of complementarity between sports betting and spending on spectator sports viewing is addressed in this chapter using Canadian household spending data. They find that spending on betting and spending on spectator sports are indeed complementary. Intriguingly, they also find that betting and spending on sports participation are substitutes. This suggests that further deregulation of sports gambling in Canada could well lead to less physical activity and more sedentary life styles for Canadians.

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  • Research Handbooks in Business and Management series

Michael Barry, James Skinner and Terry Engelberg

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  • New Horizons in the Economics of Sport series

Wladimir Andreff

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  • New Horizons in the Economics of Sport series

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  • New Horizons in the Economics of Sport series

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  • New Horizons in the Economics of Sport series

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  • New Horizons in the Economics of Sport series

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  • New Horizons in the Economics of Sport series

Xiao Gang Che and Brad R. Humphreys

Competition in sport takes a number of forms: competition between individuals, competition between teams in a league during the regular season and post-season, competition between nations in international contests, competition for incoming and existing talent, and others. We analyse the formation of rival leagues, one of the least studied forms of competition in sport. Most standard models of firm entry into an industry do not apply to rival league formation. In North America, sports leagues enjoy special protection from anti-trust law that allows them to operate as monopolists. At the league level, they also enjoy the advantages of scale economies, since a rival league must contain a large number of teams with adequate facilities in order to begin play; this generates large fixed costs associated with entry. We develop a game-theoretic model of entry of a rival league to an existing market. This model accounts for the strategic interaction between the incumbent and rival league, and includes fixed entry costs as well as the costs acquiring new players generates for both the incumbent and rival. We then illustrate the applicability of the model by examining rival league formation in the ‘Big Four’ professional sports leagues in North America, the NFL, NBA, NHL and MLB, over the past 110 years.