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Tom R. Tyler

This chapter reviews the effectiveness of deterrence, in and of itself as well as relative to the influence of consensual models of regulation that rely upon legitimacy to motivate compliance. The law governing corporate criminal enforcement, and the law and economics scholarship designed to inform it, treats deterrence as the primary goal and coercion through threatened sanctions as the most effective tool to achieve this goal. Yet the available evidence on the causes of misconduct suggests that although people do respond to threatened sanctions, the influence of coercion is often overstated relative to its actual influence upon law-related behavior. In addition consensual approaches have been found to be more effective than is commonly supposed. Taken together these findings suggest the desirability of developing a broader approach to corporate regulation using both coercive and consensual models of regulation. Given the strength of the findings for consensual models, the persistence of coercive models as the dominant and even exclusive approach to corporate crime is striking. That dominance suggests the importance of focusing on the psychological attractions of coercion to people in positions of authority. It is suggested that those in authority are attracted to this approach not only because of evidence that it can be effective but also due to the psychological benefits it affords them.

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Jennifer Arlen

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Edited by Jennifer Arlen

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Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen

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Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen

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Edited by Sandra Seubert, Oliver Eberl and Frans van Waarden

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Louise Hauberg Wilhelmsen

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Nina H.B. Jørgensen

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Andrej Savin