Community solar programs are promoted as an effective strategy to reduce economic, technological and social barriers preventing households and businesses from accessing the benefits of photovoltaic solar electricity. More recently, community solar has been identified as a tool to address the challenge of energy poverty facing low-to-moderate income households. However, many community solar programs fail to achieve high participation rates from this population. This chapter reflects on utilizing the transdisciplinary research process to design a viable community solar program using an on-going case study in a remote rural community with a high proportion of low-to-moderate income households in Michigan’s Upper Peninsula. Our research team, comprising university scientists and local public policy practitioners, gained access to social, technical and political context which helped to shape a more socially acceptable community solar program. Utilizing a transdisciplinary research approach, our current study suggests that program designers should consider community-scale criteria when considering participation, such as the retention of energy generation in the community, the opportunity for community-level decision-making and to benefit local non-profit organizations, and community pride that stems from innovation and leadership. The work offers additional support to previous findings that suggest that trusted technical experts, such as institutions of higher learning and local leaders, can assist in sociotechnical transitions like renewable energy adoption.
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Brad Barnett, Emily W. Prehoda, Abhilash Kantamneni, Richelle L. Winkler and Chelsea Schelly
Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho
This chapter argues that the emotions constitute a habitus that functions as a backdrop in which individuals and social groups with partial membership and rights in a country deploy various forms of economic, social and cultural capital in order to approximate certain features or qualities of citizenship. The chapter directs attention to the importance of considering the ways in which emotions towards transnational migration and citizenship translate into less visible but no less important expressions of political subjectivity in everyday life. The authors focuses on the affective practice of Chinese diasporic descendants in Myanmar. Their migration biographies persist into later generations and impact the extent to which diasporic descendants experience citizenship inclusion or exclusion in the country they consider their natal land.
Margot Rawsthorne and Alison de Pree
This chapter traces the history of community engagement with an inner urban social housing community over a period of 12 years, drawing on eyewitness auto-ethnography. Through community engaged teaching, learning and research in Glebe, this chapter explores how we connect and collaborate at the local level to build trust and create mutual benefit, impact and positive change. In 2004 the University of Sydney began a tentative engagement in Glebe. The community’s response was cautious, if not hostile. Residents resisted being seen as “research subjects,” seeking instead a more mutual relationship. This chapter explores the terrain of community engagement, understanding this work as one of ongoing relationship negotiation and building. It highlights the importance of trust in transforming the relationship between the University and its local community to mutual learning, action and change. This work fits poorly into new managerial performance frameworks, which hinder the take-up of community engagement by many universities, despite rhetorical statements.
Liza Lovdahl Gormsen
This chapter focuses on three interrelated issues linked to the arm’s length principle. First, it considers the Commission’s legal basis for adopting an autonomous ALP different from that of the OECD (hereafter ‘the Commission ALP’) and making it an inherent part of Article 107 TFEU. Second, it questions the Commission’s methodology for applying the ALP, namely de facto using the Commission ALP as the appropriate reference framework in its analysis of a selective advantage rather than the national tax legislation. This analysis will include the Commission’s assertion that a breach of the Commission ALP confers a selective advantage within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. Third, it challenges the Commission’s view that integrated and non-integrated companies are in the same factual and legal situation for tax purposes.
Nahid Aslanbeigui and Guy Oakes
We stress the following: (1) Pigou reconceptualized economics as a science of economic welfare, arguing that economists abandon the illusion of a general theory of market failure and instead pursue case-by-case investigations, each limited by the complexity and variability of history. (2) Pigou considered the value of analytical techniques as historically contingent. In its high level of abstraction and use of mathematics, The Theory of Unemployment, the target of Keynes’s attacks in The General Theory, was a significant departure from the Marshallian dictum that economic analysis should be accessible to the educated public. (3) Pigou was most fundamentally at odds with Keynes on the latter’s confidence that the market economy was condemned to secular stagnation. In Pigou’s assessment, the signal achievement of The General Theory was the unprecedented explanatory power of its macroeconomic model.
Chapter 10 provides critical reflections of Australian case law, namely the Bathurst judgment. This landmark case shows that a duty of care was held to be owed to investors by the credit rating agency in the absence of privity of contract: a CRA has been found to owe and have breached a duty to investors with whom it had no direct relationship. On this view, the duty to exercise reasonable care and avoid negligent misstatements in developing a rating is imposed on expert professionals. The Bathurst case demonstrated that the Australian courts regard credit ratings as expert statements of fact and established that a CRA plays a public role: this implies that it is not sufficient for a CRA to publish disclaimers stating that credit ratings are simple expressions of opinions. The Bathurst judgment may be attractive for courts because of the re-characterization of ratings as factual representations rather than opinions, which would make it much easier to impose liability on credit rating agencies for negligent misrepresentation.
This chapter reflects on how the concept of authority shapes the way we think about international law. The chapter argues that the concept of authority has been a placeholder for a wide range of concerns in international law scholarship, both normative and empirical. This is in part unsurprising, as authority has had a similar fate in other domains of inquiry. Given the contested nature of authority within and outside the discipline of international law, the chapter follows a dual strategy to unpack how the concept of authority informs international law thinking and critical engagement. It first visits how core features and boundaries of the concept of authority, with an emphasis on the secular authority of a sovereign and its laws have been debated outside of the discipline of international law in the neighbouring disciplines of political theory and sociology. Next it surveys the reception of the concept of authority within international law by highlighting the dominance of the domestic liberal analogy on the one hand and the normative–empirical divide in the use of the concept of authority on the other. In the final part the chapter focuses on the contemporary critical usage of authority in international law, marked by framing the authority of international law as ‘rising’ or ‘changing form’ in the international realm.
In the previous Chapters (4_7) we discussed the numerous uses and appli¬cations of the Internet for people, companies, and systems, all within urban contexts. All of these uses and applications have come already into operation so far. In this last chapter of Part II of the book we are about to explore a rather upcoming application of IoT, probably being the most extensive, daring and crucial one, namely communications by and to vehicles, thus turning them into driverless AVs.
This chapter considers the idea or, better, ideal of the autonomy of international law. It seeks to challenge a common understanding of this autonomy that emerges in recurring disciplinary narratives aimed at demonstrating the objective impact of international legal rules in the conduct of international politics. I argue that the autonomy of international legal rules is best understood, and defended, by reference to its abstract systematicity, rather than – as has been common – the capacity of those rules to generate and impose objective standards that might restrict or preempt the political choices of states and other actors. While this more modest understanding of the autonomy of international law will not necessarily mean that it is capable of restraining the arbitrary choices and actions of powerful actors, defending the systemic autonomy of the international legal order will allow the construction of a distinctive mode of international politics that acts as an important counterfactual and critical normative discourse which structures the way in which those politics play out in practice.
In 1968, Axel Leijonhufvud published a treatise On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of Keynes that offered an interpretation of the latter quite different from standard Keynesian thinking at the time. The theme that Leijonhufvud extracted from Keynes’s Treatise on Money (1930) and General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936) is the incompleteness of information and resulting failures in the intertemporal coordination of activities in large, complex economic systems. He has made this the principal theme of his further work, his collections of essays bearing such titles as Information and Coordination (1981) and Macroeconomic Instability and Coordination (2000). Leijonhufvud criticizes Keynesian economics for its reduction of Keynes’s ideas to a neo-Walrasian “frictions” view of deviations from optimal general equilibrium. In recent writings he has extended that critique to dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)-based New Keynesian economics.