The chapter is concerned with the use of tourism as a developmental tool in urban economic (re)development strategies in Southern cities. The point of departure is that it has to be acknowledged that urban tourism in many Southern cities is largely invisible to the scholarly gaze. The existing scholarship tends to focus on ‘international’ and/or ‘overseas’ tourists, generally visiting from places in the Global North. The conceptualisation of urban tourism requires greater analytic depth to research beyond narrow views to be more attentive toregional and domestic tourists in Southern destinations and their role in urban (re)development. Related to this it is argued that such development strategies need to be clear in unpacking what urban tourism constitutes in various Southern contexts and who is targeted as a key beneficiary. Drawing on some examples it is argued that, once urban tourism is established as a key developmental strategy, path dependency can develop which can, if not clearly and carefully managed, lead to redevelopment outcomes that contradict other planning objectives in Southern cities andoften come at the expense of the urban poor.
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Margaret M. Pearson
Sustainable development has long been expressed as a core value of the government the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Recognizing that climate change would wreak havoc on China’s economy and society, and responding to public opinion over severe air pollution, China’s government has engaged extensively in international climate change negotiations. Yet China’s participation in global climate cooperation must be understood in light of the fact that the government’s climate goals are deeply intertwined with other policy objectives, notably economic policies. Unsurprisingly, then, economic objectives and related domestic politics – vested economic interests of firms and local governments – exert deep influence on China’s climate policies. This intertwining of climate with economic goals, while not unique to China, takes on special importance as many countries and actors turn to China as a possible leader on continued climate change action.
Paul Bowles and Brian K. MacLean
Asian regional financial cooperation has its origins some two decades ago with the spur being the 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis. Regional financial cooperation took place under the auspices of the ASEAN+3 grouping, but China was initially a reluctant player. Over time, China gradually began to participate and then to assert its regional leadership credentials and has participated more fully in processes such as the multilateralization of the Chiang Mai Initiative. However, at the same time that China became more interested in leadership of Asian financial cooperation, that process has slowly ground to a halt and now stands, some 20 years later, at its point of least relevance. This, in part, results from China’s other initiatives such as renminbi internationalization and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as other developments at the national and global levels. We analyse how Asian regional financial cooperation has been, and continues to be, subject to intra-regional rivalry between China and Japan.
What drives China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)? Why did China decide to create new ‘parallel’ multilateral institutions instead of utilizing existing ones to pursue its objectives? This chapter provides a qualitative assessment of China’s multifaceted influence as donor, financer and investor, and more importantly, a new institution designer in BRI countries. By examining China’s Belt and Road Initiative, I argue that China might be challenging aspects of US dominance or preferences in some cases, but is still supportive of the neoliberal international order. Instead of challenging the dominant neoliberal norms, China has sought to build new parallel institutions (by excluding the dominant hegemon) in order to rewrite some rules in line with China’s interests and global vision and to complement the existing system by addressing infrastructure as an issue area that has been downplayed by the existing institutions.
Marcia Don Harpaz
This chapter considers whether China has embarked on a path to WTO leadership since its historic accession in 2001. It argues that in contrast to the past, China is increasingly displaying the will to lead, an essential prerequisite for state leadership. China’s trajectory towards WTO leadership is analyzed by identifying signs of its will to lead – in its rhetoric, its participation and its initiatives. The chapter maintains that indications of China’s will to lead are evident, for example, in its strong support of globalization and the multilateral trading system (not trivial given US policy since the advent of Trump), China’s continuing endorsement of the Doha Round negotiations (in contrast to other members that have declared the talks dead), and its initiation of talks on investment facilitation and active participation in talks on electronic commerce. At the same time, other factors are holding it back. For one, it is still learning how to lead in the WTO, despite moving considerably up the learning curve. More significantly, evidence of the willingness of other members to follow is presently limited. The chapter aims at offering insight into China’s behavior as a leader in the WTO, and the future leadership role it may play in the changing international trade environment, in which it is paradoxically taking over as the champion of an open global trading system, and possibly replacing US leadership in global economic governance.
Simon Chadwick, Ian Gibson and Tao Jiang
China has recently embarked upon a process which the country’s leaders hope will result in its male national team winning the World Cup by 2050. Following the initial announcement of this football vision by President Xi Jinping in November 2014, the Chinese government and businesses have subsequently engaged in a broad range of activities designed to realise the country’s goals. These activities have ranged from acquiring football clubs (for example, Italian club Inter Milan) to investing in service organisations (for example, Infront Sports and Media) and securing the rights to major sponsorships (for example, Wanda’s deal with FIFA). The activities have nevertheless resulted in the emergence of several challenges to existing systems of governance both in Chinese football and, more significantly, in football elsewhere in the world. This chapter examines recent developments in Chinese football, and analyses the governance challenges they are posing.
Adam D. Dixon
This chapter situates the China Investment Corporation (CIC) within the rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in the global political economy in the last decade, unpacking their different forms and functions as institutional investors and as policy tools to address fiscal and monetary policy dilemmas. It furthers this conventional account by considering the growth of SWFs as a power resource for states to engage the global financial economy, while also providing a source of resistance against the power of the market and global economic and social change. The problem is that as a power resource, SWFs are not easily qualified as entities focused exclusively on investing subject to purely financial motivations. Separating the inherent political nature of SWFs is impossible. This does not mean, however, that SWFs are necessarily a nefarious force that will undermine market architecture and efficiency. In the case of the CIC, rather than reflecting an exclusive concern for maximizing the long-run risk adjusted return on its investments, it is an arm of the Chinese government that is focused on addressing China’s economic development needs.
Mark Beeson and Shaomin Xu
This chapter explores the implications of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in the context of established patterns of global governance. We consider the impact that new institutional initiatives may have on the relative standing of the United States and China. We argue that developments such as the AIIB would be significant at any time, but they are especially so when Donald Trump is president, America’s willingness to provide international leadership is in doubt, and China seems to be offering alternative models of governance and development.
The internationalization of China’s energy industry has a number of features that distinguish it from other sectors. Gaining access to primary energy resources has been an important motivation for companies in the extractive industries, and this has led to a massive level of overseas investment. Companies involved in power generation have won contracts to construct infrastructure, whilst the manufacturers of wind and solar energy seek new markets and access to technology. China’s government provides explicit support to these enterprises in order to enhance national energy security, to create internationally competitive corporations, and to complement its international diplomacy. Most of these companies are state-owned, and this ownership has given them distinct advantages in their internationalization. The locations of their investments have generally been closely tied to the objectives of each investment, and have evolved in line with changing objectives and growing capacity. China’s overseas energy investments have become contentious as they are perceived to be focused on countries with poor governance, applying low social and environmental standards, and dumping goods below cost. Set against these accusations are the very real contributions that China has been making in assisting developing economies through investment and the provision of technologies and construction services at reasonable cost.
Changes in economic structure have caused China’s international political economy falling to divide into two strikingly different periods. During the rapid growth period from 1978 until an obvious turning point in 2006–07, economic conditions were dominated by labor force growth, high investment, and rapid expansion of exports. The central policy issues therefore related to export growth; an export-growth coalition favoring policies of undervaluation and investment promotion was partially balanced by a financial stability coalition that urged restraint in implementing these policies. In the second period, since 2007, labor force growth has slowed, wages have increased rapidly, and exports have declined in relative importance. Issues relating to financial internationalization and government international influence have become central. A group that seeks to maximize direct government international influence is partially balanced by a group favoring broader financial liberalization.