Browse by title

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 2,144 items :

  • Asian Economics x
Clear All
You do not have access to this content

Building a Normative Order in the South China Sea

Evolving Disputes, Expanding Options

Edited by Truong T. Tran, John B. Welfield and Thuy T. Le

The South China Sea, where a number of great powers and regional players contend for influence, has emerged as one of the most potentially explosive regions in the world today. What can be done to reduce the possibility of conflict, solve the outstanding territorial problems, and harness the potential of the sea to promote regional development, environmental sustainability and security? This book, with contributions from leading authorities in China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Australia, Singapore and the United States, seeks to illuminate these questions.
This content is available to you

John B. Welfield and Le Thuy Trang

Interstate conflict, in the view of one-third of the global decision-makers and experts assembled to compile the World Economic Forum 2015 Global Risks Report, was the most probable serious danger facing the East Asia-Pacific region over the coming decade.1 A Pew Research Center global opinion poll conducted in the spring of 2014 found that people in eight of the 11 Asian countries surveyed expressed fears about possible military conflict over territorial disputes involving the People’s Republic of China and its neighbors. In China itself, more than six in every ten citizens expressed similar concerns. Two-thirds of Americans in 2014 also feared that intensifying territorial disputes between China and its neighbors could spark an armed conflict.2 Although the World Economic Forum 2017 Global Risks Report considered such conflict as a decreasing risk in terms of likelihood and impact,3 majorities in China, Japan and several other East Asian nations remained concerned about territorial tensions and the strategic drama being played out between the United States and China on land and at sea across the region had begun to fuel fears that the “Pacific century” might be shattered by a new Pacific war.4 For better or for worse, Southeast Asia, the region which has given birth to the most vigorous efforts to construct a regional security architecture designed to ensure long-term peace and stability in Asia and the wider Pacific Basin, is today confronted by a series of intractable problems that may well constitute the greatest tests it has faced since the end of the Cold War. Much has been said about the significance of the South China Sea for the security and development of the Indo-Pacific. This sea offers the shortest route from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. About half of the world’s commerce, half of global liquefied natural gas and a third of global crude oil transit through this body of water each year.5 Two-fifths of the world’s tuna are born in the South China Sea, contributing to a multibillion-dollar fisheries industry.6 These statistics, oft-cited, are just a few indicators of the South China Sea’s importance to the region and the world at large. A durable regional security system that can deliver lasting stability and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific cannot be constructed in the absence of a smoothly functioning regional maritime order in this critical area. Yet this body of water, blessed with so many valuable resources and crisscrossed by a network of vital sea-lanes, has become the home to some of the most intractable territorial disputes in Asia and a stage for intensifying great power strategic competition. The longstanding territorial and maritime disputes simmering in the South China Sea and the machinations of great powers have been slowing down the momentum for regional cooperation and frustrating attempts to forge a robust and mutually beneficial security architecture. There is also another troubling dimension of very great significance. While the tempo of regional cooperation has slackened, the rate at which the South China Sea marine environment is deteriorating has accelerated. Forty percent of the South China Sea’s fish stocks have already been exhausted and, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, most fish resources in the western part of the South China Sea have been exploited or overexploited.7 Meanwhile, 70 percent of the South China Sea’s coral reefs are reported to be in poor or only fair condition.8 Put simply, while the challenges to the South China Sea marine environment are growing, the capacity of regional mechanisms to effectively address those challenges has been undermined or severely constrained.

You do not have access to this content

Religion and Finance

Comparing the Approaches of Judaism, Christianity and Islam

Mervyn K. Lewis and Ahmad Kaleem

Judaism, Christianity and Islam all impose obligations and constraints upon the rightful use of wealth and earthly resources. All three of these religions have well-researched views on the acceptability of practices such as usury but the principles and practices of other, non-interest, financial instruments are less well known. This book examines each of these three major world faiths, considering their teachings, social precepts and economic frameworks, which are set out as a guide for the financial dealings and economic behaviour of their adherents.
You do not have access to this content

Fan Zhang

China’s experience over the past decades is not just a story of economic growth, it is also one of institutional change. The current political-economic system is a bureaucratic market system, in which the government and the market both coexist and conflict with each other. This book gives a detailed description of the institutional evolution in China, using large amounts of documents and cases. The book provides a theory explaining the origin of China’s reform, the political and economic forces driving the reform, and the reasoning behind the stagnation and turn-over of reform.
This content is available to you

Fan Zhang

You do not have access to this content

Takatoshi Ito, Satoshi Koibuchi, Kiyotaka Sato and Junko Shimizu

Chapter 4 examines a data set based on the questionnaire surveys in 2009 and 2013. Questionnaires were sent to head offices of all Japanese manufacturing firms listed on Japan’s stock exchanges and that reported foreign sales in their consolidated financial statements. Major findings are as follows: while yen invoicing is often chosen for arm’s-length trade, the importer’s currency tends to be used in invoicing in intra-firm trade. In exports to Asian subsidiaries, US dollars are widely used. Firm size does affect the choice of invoice currency because the larger (smaller) the size of a firm, the less (more) likely the yen is to be chosen. Growing and deepening regional production networks in Asia are likely to discourage yen-invoiced transactions, even by Japanese firms. Japanese production subsidiaries that export finished goods to the world tend to choose US dollar-invoiced transactions even for their imports of semi-finished goods from their head offices.

You do not have access to this content

Takatoshi Ito, Satoshi Koibuchi, Kiyotaka Sato and Junko Shimizu

Chapter 2 surveys recent developments in theoretical and empirical studies on the question of invoice currency choice. By examining aggregate data on invoice currency, published by the authorities, it is shown that the Japanese invoicing currency pattern violates well-known stylized facts: (1) trade between advanced countries tends to be invoiced in the exporter’s currency; (2) trade between advanced and developing countries tends to be invoiced in the advanced country’s currency; and (3) differentiated products tend to be invoiced in the exporter’s currency. More homogeneous products are typically invoiced in an international currency such as the US dollar. Chapter 2 presents two puzzles. First, Japanese exports to advanced countries tend to be invoiced in the importer’s currency; and second, the share of US dollar invoicing is higher than that of yen invoicing in trade with Asia. In order to solve these puzzles, subsequent chapters examine firm-level data obtained through interviews and questionnaire surveys.

You do not have access to this content

Takatoshi Ito, Satoshi Koibuchi, Kiyotaka Sato and Junko Shimizu

Chapter 5 identifies the types of risks to which a firm is exposed and shows a conceptual diagram of exchange rate risk management strategies. New findings on Japanese firms’ exchange rate risk management approaches are also presented. Through detailed and firm-specific investigation from our firm-level surveys, we find the following characteristics. First, firms with higher sales and greater dependency on foreign markets more actively engage in currency hedging activities, including financial and operational hedging. Second, Japanese firms use both financial and operational hedging complementarily. Third, US dollar invoicing is supported by both financial and operational hedging. Fourth, yen invoicing is a substitute for operational and financial hedging. Fifth, exchange rate pass-through is also a substitute for financial hedging. However, most Japanese exporters cannot change their export price easily even if facing a large fluctuation of exchange rates. In addition, larger sized firms are more likely to increase the degree of pass-through than smaller firms.

You do not have access to this content

Takatoshi Ito, Satoshi Koibuchi, Kiyotaka Sato and Junko Shimizu

Chapter 3 examines a new data set based on interviews with 23 globally operating Japanese firms. Novel findings here are three-fold. First, Japanese head offices tend to invoice in the importer’s currency in exports to advanced countries so that local subsidiaries can be free from exchange rate risk in their imports from head offices. Second, Japanese firms that export highly differentiated products or that have a dominant share in global markets tend to choose yen invoicing. Third, although Japanese firms have shifted their production bases to Asian countries, exports from these Asian bases tend to be invoiced in US dollars as long as the final destination market is the US. Thus, a smaller share of yen invoicing in Japanese exports even in the 2000s is due to the growing intra-firm trade promoted by the active overseas operations of Japanese electronics firms combined with products having US markets as their final destination.