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Neoliberal Social Justice

Rawls Unveiled

Nick Cowen

This timely and provocative book challenges the conventional wisdom that neoliberal capitalism is incompatible with social justice. Employing public choice and market process theory, Nick Cowen systematically compares and contrasts capitalism with socialist alternatives, illustrating how proponents of social justice have decisive reasons to opt for a capitalism guided by neoliberal ideas.
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George Dellis

This original and insightful book considers the ways in which public law, which emphasises legality (the Demos), and economics, a science oriented towards the markets (the Agora), intertwine. Throughout, George Dellis argues that the concepts of legality and efficiency should not be perceived separately.
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George Dellis

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Nadia E. Nedzel

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Nadia E. Nedzel

Grounded in history and written by a law professor, this book is a scholarly yet jargon-free explanation of the differences between the common and civil law concepts of the rule of law, and details how they developed out of two different cultural views of the relationships between law, individuals, and government. The author shows how those differences lead to differences in economic development, entrepreneurship, and corporate governance.  
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Viktor J. Vanberg

This important research review discusses some of the most celebrated and classical literature in the field of choice and economic welfare. It analyses material exploring how economics as a scientific enterprise may inform political decision-making. A premise that is explored paradigmatically through different interpretations including utility-individualism in the context of welfare economics, preference-individualism in social choice theory, and choice-individualism in constitutional economics. The review covers the subject’s founding literature as well as the more contemporary pieces, which have sparked further discussion in the field. This review promises to be valuable to researchers and scholars alike as well as to those gravitating towards this fascinating topic.
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Trent J. MacDonald

Much has been said about the vices and virtues of democracy. Democracy, said Benjamin Franklin, is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Lord Acton warned that democracy is susceptible to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Winston Churchill told us that democracy is actually the worst form of government . . . except for every other form that has been tried. Not without irony, he also said that the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. H. L. Mencken described democracy as the theory that people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. These quotes speak to the majoritarian dimension of democracy and the reality that even in the best-of-functioning systems 49 per cent of the people can remain unhappy. To be sure, in most modern democracies even a less-than-majority popular vote can carry an election, due to the peculiarities of electoral systems.5 Democracy, in other words, is a system to ensure that some people get what they want; it is not a system to allow everyone to do so.

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Trent J. MacDonald

The non-territorial governance concept resembles closely the political philosophy of panarchism—a specific form of governance (i.e. ‘-archy’) that encompasses all others (i.e. ‘pan-’). The central idea is that individuals should have maximum freedom to join and leave the jurisdiction of any government they choose, without having to change their current location. The classical foundations of panarchism were laid more than a century and a half ago, but underwent a long dormant period until something of a contemporary revival of panarchist political theory and philosophy in the late twentieth century and today (Tucker & de Bellis 2015): Panarchy (pan-archy: many chiefs; multi-government) is a system of competing, co-existing governments which conduct their operations within the same geographical territories without making any claims to those territories, and whose only powers derive from the consent of those they govern, i.e., those who voluntarily agree to submit to a particular government. These voluntary governments are constituted and operate on the basis of contractual personal law rather than the coercive territorial law of the Nation-State. (Taylor 1989)

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Trent J. MacDonald

Territorial political organisation forms the backbone of western liberal democracies. However, political economists are increasingly aware of how this form of government neglects the preferences of citizens, resulting in dramatic conflicts. The Political Economy of Non-Territorial Exit explores the theoretical possibility of ‘unbundling’ government functions and decentralising territorial governance.
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Trent J. MacDonald

This chapter proposes an extension of the Coase theorem to the problems of political conflict and jurisdictional change. Most political interpretations of the Coase theorem take as given a prevailing political-jurisdictional system and describe Coasean bargains within it; for instance, how post-vote trades improve efficiency or otherwise, given transaction costs and institutional rule-constraints (Parisi 1997; Klick & Parisi 2003; Luppi & Parisi 2012). But seldom do they take a wider lens to the problem; to how an encompassing political-jurisdictional system is itself an assignment of ‘property rights in franchise’ (Buchanan 1973; 1975b), and to how the transformation of this very system can be evaluated in light of the Coase theorem. Given this, should there likewise be such a thing as the ‘jurisdictional Coase theorem’? If political exploits serve to reallocate property rights within the boundaries of a state then perhaps we can trace the Coase-theoretic reallocative consequences of changes across jurisdictional boundaries too. Coase—channelling Stigler—claimed that his theorem’s ‘logic cannot be questioned, only its domain’ (1992: 717). It is my purpose to consider whether its domain extends to political and jurisdictional change. This chapter argues that changes in political jurisdictions (territorial or nonterritorial) as well as the policies enacted within them (productive or redistributive) operate to reallocate property rights. And moreover, these processes are focused on internalisation of externalities while being beset by transaction costs and are therefore episodes of Coasean exchange.