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M. Kamrul Islam and Lorenzo Rocco

This chapter contributes to a clearly important area of social capital research. The authors experimented and applied modern econometrics, including one of the instrumental variables, to derive results on causality. Social capital of the workplace reduces worker absences due to sickness and several causes.

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Mats Benner

The United States of America has been the global hegemon of science, technology and innovation since, at least, the end of the Second World War. This chapter traces the evolution of US science and innovation policy, highlighting the importance of national security concerns and, in particular, the fragmented nature of the policy system, as well as the importance of universities not only as performing institutions but also as policy-coordinating entities.

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Brian Goff

“Sport has the power to change the world.” Nelson Mandela made this observation in the context of South Africa hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup. Although the combined revenues of professional and collegiate sports cannot match those of a single large retailer, the outcome is reversed when considering the consumer time and media attention devoted to sports. Chapter 1 examines the size and source of this outsized intangible value and why fans still complain about the Dodgers move to Los Angeles 60 years after the act or why one out of every seven people on the planet watched the 2014 FIFA World Cup final. The answers are multi-layered, owing to the durable quality of sports consumption, the role that consumers play as team members, and very deep-seated connections that people make with competition.

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Robin Wilson

Assimilationism and multiculturalism faced insuperable contradictions. Even ‘progressive’ assimilation suffered from the tension between the substantive liberal norms (particularly equality) it purported to uphold and the illiberal means adopted to enforce them (such as banning the burqa in France). And its inherently relativistic notion of ‘national culture’ was incompatible with the principle of universal norms. Multiculturalism, meanwhile, could only uphold the freedom of the ‘community’ to pursue distinctive cultural practices at the expense of individual rights of voice and exit for those, especially women and girls, corralled within it. It left the majority ‘culture’ unquestioned and unwittingly engendered ‘parallel lives’ with ghettoized living. Both paradigms were overtaken by processes of globalization and individualization which rendered their essentialist conceptions of ‘culture’ obsolete.

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Geoffrey Samuel

The second chapter on what legal reasoning has been looks backwards from the medieval jurists to Roman law itself. The structural importance of the institutional scheme of persons (personae), things (res) and actions (actiones) is discussed as is the use of genus and species as the general basis of Roman law taxonomy. The chapter then goes on to examine in considerable depth the actual reasoning methods and techniques employed by the Roman jurists together with the philosophical and theory contexts in which this reasoning functioned. The relationship between these reasoning techniques and legal literature and texts is equally considered. The chapter aims to highlight several institutional and epistemological characteristics: for example the importance of the legal action (actio) as a starting point for reasoning at a case law level and the reluctance to see the source of law as existing in a set of abstract rules (regulae iuris).

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Geoffrey Samuel

This first chapter on what legal reasoning has been focuses on the medieval Italian jurists and their glosses and commentaries on Roman law. The argument is that it is the reasoning processes of these jurists that formed the direct historical basis for several particular characteristics of legal reasoning as it is today. The chapter discusses in some depth the dialectical and hermeneutical methods of these jurists and the use of divisio and distinctiones in order to solve both contradictions within the Roman sources themselves and the mass of factual problems and disputes that were relevant to the medieval period. The epistemological impact on legal thought of Aristotle’s rediscovered writings is also noted, as are the political and social issues which were theorised through the use of Roman law concepts.

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Geoffrey Samuel

This third chapter on what legal reasoning has been looks forwards from the medieval jurists to the centuries following on from the end of the Middle Ages up to present times, namely from the sixteenth century onwards. This century experienced what is often called the Humanist Revolution. As the chapter points out, the humanist jurists adopted a very different approach to the Roman texts in as much as they no longer saw these sources as timeless authorities emanating ultimately from God but as historical documents. They thus developed an historical methodology towards the Roman texts in order to be able to identify the actual (rather than altered) writings of the classical jurists whom they considered to be true legal scientists. They also brought to bear on the Roman sources ‘scientific’ thinking which involved a reorganisation of the Digest along systematic lines (following the order of the Institutes) together with, in the hands of Doneau, an orientation founded on the notion of a ‘subjective right’. These humanists were regarded as the first ‘modern’ lawyers and in subsequent centuries their rationalised thinking was developed by jurists into an axiomatic approach to law finding expression in the civil codes of Europe. In addition, the humanist jurists emphasised the importance of interpretation (interpretatio), developing many of the techniques in use today. The chapter then goes on to examine the historical development of the common law, a tradition of legal thinking that functioned outside the Roman learning (at least until the nineteenth century).

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Adrian Healy

There is now much emphasis on evidence-based policymaking. However, rather less consideration is given to the origin of that evidence. Common sources can be found in academic research, in consultancy work and through the activities of think tanks and pressure groups. Each has their own objectives, strengths and potential weaknesses. For many the ‘gold-standard’ of evidence is that of academic research. However, with pressure on academics to engage more fully with policymakers to achieve ‘impact’, this raises questions about the impartiality of academic evidence. This chapter will consider the changing landscape for evidence-based policy and its implications.

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Geoffrey Samuel

This fifth chapter continues the reflection on the legacy bequeathed by the history of legal reasoning in looking at the long relationship between reasoning and legal texts. These texts can be broadly classified into two groups: there are those designed for practitioners and professionals and those aimed at students. This reflects a distinction between the teaching and practice of law. One major theme or artefact within this literary legacy – and one that links the teaching books with the practitioner works – is legal taxonomy. Those who teach the law have strived towards a universalist outlook while the professional and practitioner have had on the whole much less interest in the rationalisation of law. This chapter thus examines the relationship between legal taxonomy (mapping the law), legal problem solving and legal reasoning. It looks in particular at the influence of the civilian principle of unjust enrichment on common lawyers and on the debates that this influence has provoked. The chapter also discusses the role and importance of empirical categories.

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Geoffrey Samuel

In this fourth chapter the aim is to identify what might be called institutional models or focal points for legal reasoning which have emerged out of the history of legal thought and reasoning. Six such models present themselves: they are the rule model, the interpretation model, the rights model, the interest model, the policy model and the remedies model. These models appear to be well entrenched in common law judicial reasoning, due no doubt, at least in part, to the influence of Roman legal ‘science’ on the common lawyers following the abolition of the forms of action. Each model is discussed in some depth.