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The distinction between amendment and revision is foundational to our present understanding of formal constitutional change. Scholars have suggested how to differentiate amendment from revision, constitutional designers have entrenched distinct procedures for each, and judges have applied both of these concepts to actual cases and controversies. Yet even at its best the distinction is unclear and it raises more questions than it offers answers. My purpose in this invited contribution to the Edward Elgar Handbook on Comparative Constitution Making is to clarify the distinction between amendment and revision from a perspective internal to the scholarship on constitutional change. I suggest with reference to jurisdictions as varied as Belize, Canada, the Czech Republic, India and the United States that an amendment should be understood as an effort to continue the constitution-making project that began at the founding moment, while a revision should be understood as an effort to unmake the constitution by introducing an extraordinary change that is inconsistent with the fundamental presuppositions of the constitution. I conclude by suggesting that our reinterpretation of the distinction between amendment and revision nonetheless remains susceptible to exploitation.

The chapter begins with a description of the imperfect character of the EMU, one of the main components of the European Economic Constitution, and the crisis-induced mechanisms to address any ensuing external, asymmetrical shocks. In absence of monetary policy instruments at the national level, fiscal policies can become overwhelmed if country-specific shocks are very large and not well catered for by the shock-absorbing capacity of the economy and the financial sector. Hence, risk-sharing in the EMU takes place through two channels: the market channel and the fiscal channel. In particular, the second section examines the preventive and corrective fiscal rules, the third elaborates on the role that the European Stability Mechanism and the European Central Bank play in providing fiscal relief to Member States in need, and the fourth section analyses how the Banking Union is aimed to absorb fiscal imbalances rather than reinforce them. We then conclude.