Much has been said about the vices and virtues of democracy. Democracy, said Benjamin Franklin, is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Lord Acton warned that democracy is susceptible to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Winston Churchill told us that democracy is actually the worst form of government . . . except for every other form that has been tried. Not without irony, he also said that the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. H. L. Mencken described democracy as the theory that people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. These quotes speak to the majoritarian dimension of democracy and the reality that even in the best-of-functioning systems 49 per cent of the people can remain unhappy. To be sure, in most modern democracies even a less-than-majority popular vote can carry an election, due to the peculiarities of electoral systems.5 Democracy, in other words, is a system to ensure that some people get what they want; it is not a system to allow everyone to do so.
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The Role of Organizations, Markets and Communities in Social Innovation
Edited by Gerard George, Ted Baker, Paul Tracey and Havovi Joshi
Edited by Dagmar Simon, Stefan Kuhlmann, Julia Stamm and Weert Canzler
Trent J. MacDonald
The non-territorial governance concept resembles closely the political philosophy of panarchism—a specific form of governance (i.e. ‘-archy’) that encompasses all others (i.e. ‘pan-’). The central idea is that individuals should have maximum freedom to join and leave the jurisdiction of any government they choose, without having to change their current location. The classical foundations of panarchism were laid more than a century and a half ago, but underwent a long dormant period until something of a contemporary revival of panarchist political theory and philosophy in the late twentieth century and today (Tucker & de Bellis 2015): Panarchy (pan-archy: many chiefs; multi-government) is a system of competing, co-existing governments which conduct their operations within the same geographical territories without making any claims to those territories, and whose only powers derive from the consent of those they govern, i.e., those who voluntarily agree to submit to a particular government. These voluntary governments are constituted and operate on the basis of contractual personal law rather than the coercive territorial law of the Nation-State. (Taylor 1989)
Dagmar Simon, Stefan Kuhlmann, Julia Stamm and Weert Canzler
This Handbook on Science and Public Policy will capture a landscape in flux: the relation between science and society has been changing in the last decades, and it has become a hot topic in the science system and in science policy studies. Even though historically the topic is not new, it seems that the roles of science and innovation are being debated more explicitly: the demand for science-based innovation is growing while the legitimation of scientific research is being questioned. Scientific knowledge is hailed as a significant societal and economic resource in global competition. Innovations emerging from science are considered to be the key to market success and prosperity. At the same time, scientific knowledge and research-based innovation are supposed to address so-called grand societal challenges and help achieve ‘sustainable development goals’ (United Nations 2015). Yet, there is also pressure to legitimise the increasing amounts of public funding for research worldwide. And the questions ‘how does society benefit from science?’ and ‘which research is “relevant” and “useful”?’ are raised emphatically. The changing relationship between science and society significantly challenges science policy: research is expected to foster and support innovation not only via new technologies but also in a way which is socially acceptable and sustainable. Moreover, it is expected to develop new instruments, methods and practices for its own accountability and legitimation that are accepted by the scientific community. This is where this Handbook comes in. It focuses on how science policy has changed over the last decades and raises several overarching questions: What are the consequences of changing science policies for science and the science systems nationally and internationally? How far do they go? Do they tackle the fundamental principles of science, its norms, standards and reputation systems? And what does this mean for modern science (and technology)? The chapters of the Handbook provide different answers from a broad range of theoretical and conceptual perspectives.
Trent J. MacDonald
Trent J. MacDonald
This chapter proposes an extension of the Coase theorem to the problems of political conflict and jurisdictional change. Most political interpretations of the Coase theorem take as given a prevailing political-jurisdictional system and describe Coasean bargains within it; for instance, how post-vote trades improve efficiency or otherwise, given transaction costs and institutional rule-constraints (Parisi 1997; Klick & Parisi 2003; Luppi & Parisi 2012). But seldom do they take a wider lens to the problem; to how an encompassing political-jurisdictional system is itself an assignment of ‘property rights in franchise’ (Buchanan 1973; 1975b), and to how the transformation of this very system can be evaluated in light of the Coase theorem. Given this, should there likewise be such a thing as the ‘jurisdictional Coase theorem’? If political exploits serve to reallocate property rights within the boundaries of a state then perhaps we can trace the Coase-theoretic reallocative consequences of changes across jurisdictional boundaries too. Coase—channelling Stigler—claimed that his theorem’s ‘logic cannot be questioned, only its domain’ (1992: 717). It is my purpose to consider whether its domain extends to political and jurisdictional change. This chapter argues that changes in political jurisdictions (territorial or nonterritorial) as well as the policies enacted within them (productive or redistributive) operate to reallocate property rights. And moreover, these processes are focused on internalisation of externalities while being beset by transaction costs and are therefore episodes of Coasean exchange.
Trent J. MacDonald
In this chapter we present a framework describing the trade-off between inefficient markets, politics and jurisdictions, and apply it to the problem of jurisdictional design. The framework adapts the Djankov et al. (2003) model of the comparative social costs associated with an institution to analyse the institutional structures that exist in the political-jurisdictional Coase theorem. Different allocations of property rights and political authority associate to different institutional systems, which can be arrayed along a political-jurisdictional possibility frontier. We consider the tradeoffs as we move around that frontier, and suggest further applications of the model. Our approach provides an institutional efficiency-based approach to the evaluation of mixes of political-jurisdictional rules. We introduce a political-jurisdictional possibilities frontier (PJPF) to illustrate the space of property-authority allocations (as politicaljurisdictional rules) and a political-jurisdictional transformation frontier (PJTF) to illustrate movements about property-authority allocations. These build on the political-jurisdictional Coase theorem from the previous chapter, where three sources of inefficiencies were outlined: (1) political transaction costs (PTCs); (2) jurisdictional transaction costs (JTCs); and (3) market (contracting) transaction costs (CTCs). Consequently, these form the three axes of an institutional possibilities space, the contours of which represent the property right allocations (and hence societal efficiency) that are possible for a given society.
Trent J. MacDonald
Citizens, as consumers of political goods, face a cost–benefit calculus associated with the decision to stay in a particular jurisdiction—a state, whether a nation-state or a regional state—or whether to exit to one with a better ratio of benefits to costs. In this way, Charles Tiebout (1956) argued that if different states made different competitive offerings of local public goods, and people were free to move between states in the direction of their preferences and willingness to pay, the result would be an efficient allocation of policies and people over jurisdictions. The Tiebout model was expressed as ‘voting with one’s feet’ but it is equally valid to think of this as ‘shopping for public goods’. The significance of the Tiebout sorting model is usually presented as a non-political solution to the free-riding problem, but at a deeper level it highlights a basic symmetry between the redrawing of political maps—whether by war and conquest, by negotiation and purchase, or by secession or integration—and the movement of people. If people can move, states don’t have to. In this chapter, as throughout this book, we are interested in the other side of this symmetry: if states can move, then will people not have to? Moreover, we explore how the jurisdictional shape of states can be understood as a spontaneous order outcome of this process at the level of personal secession and group formation. However, there are two limitations to the Tiebout model: (1) the spatial map of jurisdictions is in an important sense both given and arbitrary, and (2) the resulting constellations of citizens as groupings, which is an emergent property of the Tiebout sorting, takes place primarily over individuals selecting bundles of public goods (and, importantly, not bundles of other citizens). Both of these are problematic in real economies in real political systems. First, political choices are always bundled with economic choices (Tiebout’s original model assumed this complexity away by making all income a rent), and often the economic choices will be primary (Schleicher 2010). Second, citizens do seek to agglomerate with specific other citizens (usually in homophilic affinity groups; see McPherson, Smith-Lovin & Cook 2001; Currarini, Jackson & Pin 2009) and so choose groups as much as they choose local public goods.