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Promise, Application and Pitfalls
Edited by John Storm Pedersen and Adrian Wilkinson
Elin M. Oftedal and Lene Foss
This chapter discusses how responsible start-ups are met in the health sector. Through following three companies, Voco, Cora and Medicus, we acquire insight into the world of challenges the entrepreneurs have when they introduce their technology/service to the healthcare sector. Using institutional theory, we look at the regulative, normative and cognitive dimension of the institutional framework. We use the term ‘institutional wall’ to denote a dense network of formal laws and regulation, informal norms and knowledge and beliefs that act as barriers for the entrepreneurs to access the market. We find that while there is a positive development in the regulative dimension: both the regulative and the normative dimension are set up to favour larger companies. The founders’ responses to the cognitive dimension indicate a lack of belief in Norwegian technology and thus tough access to finance.
A Global Resource
Edited by René von Schomberg and Jonathan Hankins
Empowering the Patient
Edited by Tatiana Iakovleva, Elin M. Oftedal and John Bessant
Trent J. MacDonald
Much has been said about the vices and virtues of democracy. Democracy, said Benjamin Franklin, is two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Lord Acton warned that democracy is susceptible to a ‘tyranny of the majority’. Winston Churchill told us that democracy is actually the worst form of government . . . except for every other form that has been tried. Not without irony, he also said that the best argument against democracy is a five-minute conversation with the average voter. H. L. Mencken described democracy as the theory that people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard. These quotes speak to the majoritarian dimension of democracy and the reality that even in the best-of-functioning systems 49 per cent of the people can remain unhappy. To be sure, in most modern democracies even a less-than-majority popular vote can carry an election, due to the peculiarities of electoral systems.5 Democracy, in other words, is a system to ensure that some people get what they want; it is not a system to allow everyone to do so.
Edited by Dagmar Simon, Stefan Kuhlmann, Julia Stamm and Weert Canzler
Trent J. MacDonald
The non-territorial governance concept resembles closely the political philosophy of panarchism—a specific form of governance (i.e. ‘-archy’) that encompasses all others (i.e. ‘pan-’). The central idea is that individuals should have maximum freedom to join and leave the jurisdiction of any government they choose, without having to change their current location. The classical foundations of panarchism were laid more than a century and a half ago, but underwent a long dormant period until something of a contemporary revival of panarchist political theory and philosophy in the late twentieth century and today (Tucker & de Bellis 2015): Panarchy (pan-archy: many chiefs; multi-government) is a system of competing, co-existing governments which conduct their operations within the same geographical territories without making any claims to those territories, and whose only powers derive from the consent of those they govern, i.e., those who voluntarily agree to submit to a particular government. These voluntary governments are constituted and operate on the basis of contractual personal law rather than the coercive territorial law of the Nation-State. (Taylor 1989)
Dagmar Simon, Stefan Kuhlmann, Julia Stamm and Weert Canzler
This Handbook on Science and Public Policy will capture a landscape in flux: the relation between science and society has been changing in the last decades, and it has become a hot topic in the science system and in science policy studies. Even though historically the topic is not new, it seems that the roles of science and innovation are being debated more explicitly: the demand for science-based innovation is growing while the legitimation of scientific research is being questioned. Scientific knowledge is hailed as a significant societal and economic resource in global competition. Innovations emerging from science are considered to be the key to market success and prosperity. At the same time, scientific knowledge and research-based innovation are supposed to address so-called grand societal challenges and help achieve ‘sustainable development goals’ (United Nations 2015). Yet, there is also pressure to legitimise the increasing amounts of public funding for research worldwide. And the questions ‘how does society benefit from science?’ and ‘which research is “relevant” and “useful”?’ are raised emphatically. The changing relationship between science and society significantly challenges science policy: research is expected to foster and support innovation not only via new technologies but also in a way which is socially acceptable and sustainable. Moreover, it is expected to develop new instruments, methods and practices for its own accountability and legitimation that are accepted by the scientific community. This is where this Handbook comes in. It focuses on how science policy has changed over the last decades and raises several overarching questions: What are the consequences of changing science policies for science and the science systems nationally and internationally? How far do they go? Do they tackle the fundamental principles of science, its norms, standards and reputation systems? And what does this mean for modern science (and technology)? The chapters of the Handbook provide different answers from a broad range of theoretical and conceptual perspectives.
Trent J. MacDonald
Trent J. MacDonald
This chapter proposes an extension of the Coase theorem to the problems of political conflict and jurisdictional change. Most political interpretations of the Coase theorem take as given a prevailing political-jurisdictional system and describe Coasean bargains within it; for instance, how post-vote trades improve efficiency or otherwise, given transaction costs and institutional rule-constraints (Parisi 1997; Klick & Parisi 2003; Luppi & Parisi 2012). But seldom do they take a wider lens to the problem; to how an encompassing political-jurisdictional system is itself an assignment of ‘property rights in franchise’ (Buchanan 1973; 1975b), and to how the transformation of this very system can be evaluated in light of the Coase theorem. Given this, should there likewise be such a thing as the ‘jurisdictional Coase theorem’? If political exploits serve to reallocate property rights within the boundaries of a state then perhaps we can trace the Coase-theoretic reallocative consequences of changes across jurisdictional boundaries too. Coase—channelling Stigler—claimed that his theorem’s ‘logic cannot be questioned, only its domain’ (1992: 717). It is my purpose to consider whether its domain extends to political and jurisdictional change. This chapter argues that changes in political jurisdictions (territorial or nonterritorial) as well as the policies enacted within them (productive or redistributive) operate to reallocate property rights. And moreover, these processes are focused on internalisation of externalities while being beset by transaction costs and are therefore episodes of Coasean exchange.