The growth of precarious employment has drawn attention to a mounting crisis in employment standards enforcement, as mechanisms within traditional employment law are increasingly ineffective at ensuring protection for workers in precarious jobs. This growing enforcement crisis has coincided with the adoption of new regulatory strategies that show an increasing influence of regulatory new governance. Using reforms in four jurisdictions as illustrative examples, and set in the context of the employment standards enforcement crisis, this chapter raises serious concerns around the emergence of new modes of regulatory governance. The authors argue that new modes of regulation that fail to account adequately for the power dynamics of the employment relationship risk entrenching processes of regulatory degradation. In light of this failure, the chapter outlines four principles for more effective employment standards regulation that aim to balance aspects of traditional regulatory models with a selective application of more promising elements of regulatory new governance with the primary aim of ensuring regulatory protection for workers in precarious jobs.
Browse by title
Leah F. Vosko, John Grundy and Mark P. Thomas
Convenience in White-Collar Crime
Most theories of white-collar crime can be found along the behavioral dimension. Numerous suggestions have been presented by researchers to explain why famous people have committed financial crime. In this chapter, some of the most prominent theories are presented: differential association theory, theory of self-control and desire-for-control, slippery slope theory, and neutralization theory. Crime is not committed by systems, routines, or organizations. Crime is committed by individuals. White-collar criminals practice a deviant behavior to carry out their offenses. White-collar crime is committed by members of the privileged socioeconomic class who are using their power and influence. Offenders are typically charismatic, have a need for control, have a tendency to bully subordinates, fear losing their status and position, exhibit narcissistic tendencies, lack integrity and social conscience, have no feelings of guilt, and do not perceive themselves as criminals.
Todd J. Zywicki and Shruti Rajagopalan
In this chapter we provide an explanation for why the Chapter 11 reorganization process cannot accurately value and reorganize an insolvent firm. Due to the information and incentive vacuum of the reorganization process, Chapter 11 places the bankruptcy judge in the same institutional setting as a central planner. Therefore, the bankruptcy judge is given the impossible task of economic calculation without the relevant market data to calculate the same. Given the inability to make market allocations, Chapter 11 allocations are prone to rent-seeking and interest group capture.
Todd J. Zywicki and Edward P. Stringham
Is the common law efficient? Neoclassical economists debate whether our inherited systems of judge-made law maximize wealth whereas Austrian economists typically adopt much different standards. The chapter reviews neoclassical and Austrian arguments about efficiency in the common law. After presenting Hayek’s views on the common law as a spontaneous order it concludes that the common law can indeed be viewed as a spontaneous order only when judges provide their services in a free and competitive system.
Michael E. DeBow
This chapter provides a history of the expanding domain of tort law in the United States, with a particular focus on the spread of the concept of strict liability and a consonant erosion of contractual liability in favor of torts. It then surveys differing Austrian viewpoints on the moral standard underlying torts, the merits of the common law, intentional and unintentional torts, and product liability. It concludes that Austrian scholars who are comfortable with the normative standard of “individual freedom from domination” should conduct research countering the case for the ever-growing expansion of tort law.
Peter G. Klein and Thomas A. Lambert
This chapter applies Austrian insights relevant to analysis of American business law. Modern corporation and partnership law, perhaps surprisingly, largely coheres with an Austrian theory of the firm, although recent regulations affecting corporate conduct and securities offerings, enacted in the wake of financial scandals, undermine these principles. On the other hand, antitrust law operates under a static view of markets that is inconsistent with Austrian principles, although recent antitrust decisions have been more consistent. We set forth aspects of Austrian thought most relevant to an analysis of American business law. We have shown that this rich body of thought that has proven so useful in analyses of institutions (e.g., the Socialist Calculation debate) and monetary and fiscal policies (e.g., Austrian business cycle theory) has much to offer in the economic analysis of specific legal rules.
Maarten van Klaveren and Kea Tijdens
This chapter aims to assess the size of informal employment from a gender perspective, focusing on industries with large shares of women workers and based on evidence from 14 countries. In these countries informal work was predominantly found in the agricultural sector. With a decreasing share of agriculture in total employment and a stable share of women, in the 2000s women’s informal employment decreased overall. The (further) shift of employment out of agriculture may be crucial for reducing vulnerable employment. However, in most countries this shift only partly translates into less vulnerable and higher value added activities, in particular in view of the characteristics of employment in commerce. The authors note that the lack of employment data on agriculture in national statistics hampers insight in the constraints for women of this major transformation, notably in terms of infrastructural provisions and basic services needed.
Donald J. Boudreaux
Austrian economics identifies three reasons, any one of which invalidates antitrust as a mechanism for ensuring competition. The first is the political economy realization that antitrust cannot be administered without political cronyism, which will blunt its effectiveness. The second is the problem of knowledge; no antitrust judge or regulator can know all the relevant facts for rendering a decision that improves the operation of markets. Either of these is fatal to the arguments for antitrust. This chapter will focus on the third objection: antitrust is premised on a flawed, static model of competition. By not recognizing that competition is a dynamic process involving innovation, antitrust actually thwarts competition, achieving the opposite of its intended effect.