Browse by title

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 16,363 items :

  • Business and Management x
  • Chapters/Articles x
Clear All Modify Search
This content is available to you

Lorraine Eden

You do not have access to this content

Lorraine Eden

This content is available to you

Edited by Diane Nijs

You do not have access to this content

Diane Nijs

You do not have access to this content

Edited by Charles A. Ingene, James R. Brown and Rajiv P. Dant

You do not have access to this content

Mateo Gargantini

The most recent developments in the legal framework for corporate governance increasingly focus on the monitoring role of shareholders and, more specifically, on their engagement with investee companies. These developments aim at reducing agency problems along the investment chain by enhancing equity investors' oversight and asset managers' accountability.

You do not have access to this content

Christopher Teichmann and Lothar Wolff

Shareholders are to a large extent investing in companies that are not governed by their own jurisdiction. Consequently, the enforcement of shareholders’ duties arising from national law frequently involves a cross-border element. This means that within the European Union, state measures regulating and enforcing shareholder duties will have to be assessed in the light of primary EU law, which affects practically all transnational economic activities in the Common Market.

You do not have access to this content

Christian A. Witting

There is intense debate in the European Union and beyond about the current responsibilities and potential liabilities of shareholders. This chapter argues for greater attention to be paid to the design of a liability regime that incen¬tivises all participants in corporate endeavours to take appropriate measures to avoid the causation of personal injuries. The appropriate liability regime should incentivise shareholders to undertake their statutorily assigned roles in the governance of investee companies - namely, through making proper appointments to corporate boards and undertaking proper monitoring of corporate risk-imposition. The chapter argues that the only incentive that is likely to ensure that shareholders do their part is a residual personal liability for unsatisfied personal injury claims.

You do not have access to this content

Edited by Charles A. Ingene, James R. Brown and Rajiv P. Dant