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Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley
When New Institutional Economics (NIE) first appeared on the scholarly scene in the early 1970s, it was a transformative movement. NIE aimed to radically alter orthodox economics by showing that institutions are multidimensional and matter in significant ways that can be statistically measured and systematically modeled. In the decades since, thousands of articles and books have pursued this premise and NIE has evolved from an upstart movement to a major influence on researchers in economics, political science, law, management, and sociology. What made New Institutional Economics a radical idea was that it abandoned: [. . .]the standard neoclassical assumptions that individuals have perfect information and unbounded rationality and that transactions are costless and instantaneous. NIE assumes instead that individuals have incomplete information and limited mental capacity and because of this they face uncertainty about unforeseen events and outcomes and incur transaction costs to acquire information. To reduce risk and transaction costs humans create institutions, writing and enforcing constitutions, laws, contracts and regulations – so-called formal institutions – and structuring and inculcating norms of conduct, beliefs and habits of thought and behavior – or informal institutions. (Menard and Shirley, 2005, p. 1)
Edited by John R. Bryson, Lauren Andres and Rachel Mulhall
The aim of this ending chapter is to present a structured summary of the previous chapters and tie them together through lingering on some cross-chapter themes and contributions in view of the aims of the book. Some of the main themes in this book at macro-level will moreover be tied into a previous book of mine 20 years back (as of April 2018) on the rise of intellectual capitalism and the economics and management of IP at micro-level. The chapter will end with a final plea for transnational technology and innovation governance in light of the crucial roles of new technologies and innovations and for global challenges and welfare. The general aim of this book has been to present a research-based analysis of the linkages between R & D, patents, innovations, growth and welfare and thereby increase our knowledge about how R & D of new technologies and innovations can contribute to growth and ultimately to welfare in society. A corollary aim has then been to focus specifically on patents and their linkages since patent and IP issues have been somewhat disconnected in general from R & D, innovations and economic growth in studies and debate of the latter. A subsidiary aim has been to clarify and offer a number of key concepts, distinctions and models in an attempt to contribute to a professional language in the innovation policy and management area. A final aim of the book has been to contribute to research in the innovation and IP area by offering some answers to common research questions as well as offering methods and suggestions for further IP policy research.
This chapter discusses the existing public policies for start-ups and Venture Capital and the empirical evidence of their effects on the opportunistic behavior of the actors of the technological and financial ecosystem, with a focus on the Italian environment. Problems of governance of academic organizations are analyzed first, in order to understand the factors that affect entrepreneurial behaviors of researchers and the motivational systems that spur individuals and departments to act in an entrepreneurial way. The effects of fiscal incentives on the performance of the start-up ecosystem are finally examined.
Behavioral regulation is on the agenda of politicians and authorities of most countries as coercive legislation has financial and political costs that are becoming difficult to afford. However, not all measures are equivalent, and not all of them are effective and appropriate in any situation: some issues have thus to be discussed to develop an effective and balanced approach. The preliminary step is the development of a shared vision of objectives of the regulation; once this is reached there are some issues specific to the behavioral approach. The first one is answering the question of the preferability of the gentle push over mandatory rules; then, if we accept the fact that regulators have the right and the duty to regulate, we should be confident that they are competent enough; finally there is the issue of responsibility: what happens, who is responsible and what are the consequences if things go wrong?
Gregorio De Felice
The 2017 edition of the ‘Survey on Italian Saving and Financial Choices’, carried out yearly by Centro Einaudi and Intesa Sanpaolo, reveals some inconsistencies in the attitude of Italian savers towards investment. First, while showing quite a low propensity to bear risk, very few people diversify their investments. Second, even if understanding the degree of risk inherent in different investment proposals is perceived as the single most difficult task that savers must afford, people do not devote time and effort to gain financial information. Although initiatives are already underway in Italy in the field of financial education, greater effort is probably needed. The good news is that respondents aged between 18 and 24 show comparatively higher financial competence: this could represent a promising indication for the future.