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Kenneth P. Ruscio

A premise of democratic theory is that leaders in democracies must be held accountable, power must be constrained, and when the boundaries of appropriate exercise of power are breeched, democracies must have mechanisms to correct the transgression. This chapter examines the origins and development of that basic premise and how it is consistent with other premises of democratic theory, such as: no one is above the law; the writers of the law cannot exempt themselves from it; and power in a democracy is divided, checked, and never completely lodged in one person or office. Two presumptions are the basis for accountability. One is that leaders and government make mistakes. That is the “fallibist” presumption. The goal of democracies is not perfection but rather avoiding the worst outcomes and correcting their inevitable mistakes. The other is that leaders have at least the opportunity and often the propensity to abuse power in their own self-interest. That is the “tyrannical” presumption, and a democracy guards against that by constraining leaders through constitutional parameters and norms of forbearance. The chapter concludes with a brief case study of the recent controversy over President Trump’s declaration of a national emergency on the southern border. It illustrates many of the underlying contemporary questions surrounding the ways in which achieving accountability are anything but simple. Why is the premise of accountability (still) central to democracy and what mechanisms (still?) allow contemporary democracy to achieve accountability?

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Edited by Melody C. Barnes, Corey D.B. Walker and Thad M. Williamson

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Finn Laursen

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Finn Laursen

This chapter discusses analytical issues: How do we study the initiation and development of the EU’s marine and maritime policies? Which concepts and theoretical frameworks do we have, and how relevant do we expect them to be? How can we explain later reforms of these policies? The theoretical overview includes International Relations (IR) theories, contrasting especially realist and liberal theories, based on the assumption that the initiation and development of the EU’s sea-related policies is very much a response to international developments. But based on the assumption that endogenous forces have also been important the chapter outlines the basic propositions of the classical integration theories, contrasting especially neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. What roles have the common institutions played in comparison with the member states? Looking at the latter it is suggested that we need to look at the role of domestic politics. What this all means is that we need to look at forces and developments at three levels: international, EU-systemic, and domestic, and to arrive at explanations we need to combine theories focussing on these three different levels. The chapter also looks at neo-institutionalist theories, with focus on historical institutionalism and sociological institutionalism. The latter allows the introduction of ideational factors that arguably have played an important role in recent policy reforms aiming for sustainability.

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Melody C. Barnes and Thad M. Williamson

Richmond, Virginia (the authors’ home) is a study in contradictions: the former capital of the Confederacy and a center of Jim Crow politics and later resistance to the civil rights movement, it also is the home to numerous forms of democratic struggle, from voting rights activism to the recent launch of community wealth building initiatives aimed at fighting poverty systemically. Richmond’s story is one of Southern history, but it is also an American story and one that can help us understand why democracy has proven so frustrating, today. It illuminates the earliest and most deep-seated defects in our founding DNA, including slavery and its legacy. It also demonstrates how those defects create persistent inequities that ensure that—even as we have made progress—the “America” of our essential and aspirational principles does not exist – and has never existed. In Richmond, as throughout the nation, our frequently stated commitments to liberty, equality, and constitutional democracy collide full force with the realities of our history and the institutional legacy it has bequeathed. So, here is the question for us today: can we create and sustain the America that never was? Can we build a multicultural democracy in which everyone participates politically and economically, and a new, inclusive American identity takes hold? The authors believe we can, but only if we acknowledge the truth and adopt a new paradigm to organize our communities, and our political and economic life. The authors believe that community wealth building - led at the local level but with ample support from the state and federal level, and with a supportive architecture of federal rights and policy - should be at the core of a progressive, inclusive, and effective governance paradigm. It offers a framework for challenging America’s deep legacies of inequality, racism, and sexism in fundamental ways, and for expanding democratic participation, one community at a time; and a pathway for building the American community that never has been but should and must be.

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Isabel Sawhill

Underlying the discontents characterizing American democracy is a mindset that has treated markets as the ultimate arbiter of human worth - a mindset the author labels “capitalism” or “market fundamentalism” for short. The basic idea is that markets work, governments don’t. This ideology has been especially strong in the U.S. in recent decades. This chapter argues that this mindset has led to ever-rising inequality and a government that has been captured by business interests and the wealthy. It is creating a spiral that can only end in crisis unless the intellectual foundations of the current system are better understood and challenged.

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Finn Laursen

This chapter deals with the Common Maritime Transport Policy (CMTP), which was slower to develop than the fisheries policy. It was partly some international developments the led to the start of a common maritime transport policy from the late 1970s, including demands for cargo sharing from developing countries inside the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). But it was speeded up in the mid-1980s in connection with the completion of the internal market in the second part of the 1980s up to the 1992 deadline and beyond. Activism of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) was a factor in the developments. The ECJ decided in 1974 that the general principles of Community law applied to sea transport, and in 1985 the Court ruled that the Council (read member states) had failed to ensure freedom to provide services in international transport, including maritime transport. Services being a part of the internal market the European Commission also played a leadership role at this point producing the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market in 1985 and setting the 1992 deadline for adoption of the required legislation (regulations and directives). In 1986 four important regulations were adopted, followed by one on liberalisation of cabotage in 1991, and in 2004 competition policy was extended to the transport sector. We see both external and internal forces propelling the development of the EU’s maritime transport policy.

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Margaret Kohn

Community wealth building (CWB) is an established global paradigm with a long history. In Italy, 10 percent of private employment is in the cooperative sector, which makes it a particularly successful example of successful CWB. In this chapter, the author provides an overview of the organizational and regulatory structure of the cooperative movement in Italy and explains the features that have played a role in its growth. Solidaristic forms of economic life are granted special protection in the Italian Constitution. The Italian cooperative movement provides an illustration of the benefits of state support for the solidarity economy. Legally recognized cooperatives must be governed by democratic principles and the surplus is retained by the firm or distributed to members. Cooperatives receive tax advantages, which makes it easier to compete against capitalist firms. They are also required to contribute to federated umbrella organizations, which provide assistance to member cooperatives and oversee programs that grow the sector. In the past 40 years, the movement has expanded to include new types of cooperatives that directly aim to advance the common good rather than just the mutual benefit of members. Social cooperatives work with local governments to provide social services to vulnerable populations and/or employment to disadvantaged people. Community cooperatives are hybrids that promote economic activity in areas that have experienced disinvestment. They do so by involving multiple stakeholders who are interested in broader, non-commodifiable benefits that are rooted in a specific place. A key feature of the Italian cooperative movement is its integrated and pluralistic character that links together a range of different forms of solidaristic economic activity. The regulatory framework developed in Italy can serve a model for emerging solidarity economies in the United States.

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Corey D.B. Walker and Thad M. Williamson

The conclusion briefly summarize key themes from the book, then focuses on critical questions pertaining to community wealth building as a candidate paradigm for addressing the deep challenges facing American democracy in the 21st century. This short concluding chapter lays out agendas for both academic research and continued practical work at multiple scales (local, state, national) to test, refine, improve, and implement community wealth building as well as related democratic reforms in the coming decade.

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Finn Laursen

This chapter is the second chapter on the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). It studies the conservation and management policy which was finally adopted in 1983 as well as its successive reforms until the latest relatively major reform in 2013. After the introduction of the 200-mile fishing zone in the North Sea and Atlantic Ocean the European Community (EC) claimed fishing rights to a large area. Efforts to adopt a conservation and management policy for these EC waters only produced ad hoc and temporary solutions. But as the derogations from free access from the Accession Treaty of 1972 were expiring in 1982 there was pressure on the EC to adopt a more lasting conservation and management policy. In the meantime, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had also ruled that the conservation of the biological resources of the sea was an exclusive competence of the EC. With slight delay a conservation and management policy was adopted in 1983, based first of all on national quotas and relative stability, but also a new 10-year derogation for the 12-mile coastal zones where states could reserve fishing for their nationals. Subsequently there were reforms of the CFP every 10 years, in 1992, 2002 and 2013. These reforms focused on reducing overfishing, eventually by introducing total allowable catches (TACs) based on maximum sustainable yield (MSY) founded on scientific data. By 2013 the Lisbon Treaty had made the European Parliament a co-legislator, giving environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) more access points.