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Eli Noam

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Eli Noam

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Eli Noam

In this chapter, we discuss the issue of market power in the online video field, which is arguably the most troubling aspect of this emerging online video system. We analyze the options of dealing with market power of online video platforms. They include the delegation of regulation to the industry; regulation as a public utility; provision by a public enterprise; licensing and registration; ownership restrictions; limits to foreign ownership and provision; antitrust breakup, functional separations, and unbundling; and interconnection. We concluded with a recommended “Open Video System” based on access rights to infrastructure and platform elements, where significant media market power (SMMP) exist. Such access would be accomplished through API software interfaces that must be offered by such platforms. (APIs), a way to let software by other parties interoperate with the platform’s software. Conditions of access would be governed by the non-discriminatory principle of “most favored nation,” subject to arbitration by a self-administrative process. A key role would be played by the personal information management curators. They would engage, in the consumer’s behalf, in the finding, selecting, and screening of appropriate content and infrastructure, as well as in the protection of personal data, They would be able to supply their own algorithms. Such an Open Video System does not solve all policy problems, and it needs to be limited when it comes to content or data. But it reduces the problem of market power of the platforms and its global extension. It will create, without breakups, a more competitive video cloud market. In doing so it reduces the need for detailed governmental control and oversight.

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Eli Noam

This chapter summarizes several of the analyses and empirical findings from other chapters: economic and technological drivers of change, new types of content, the emergence of video cloud providers, their market power, and their impact on other media industries and on society. This leads to a number of business and policy strategies, and to a recommended access arrangement.

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Ruth Towse and Trilce Navarrete Hernández

Over the past sixty or so years, cultural economics has established itself as a field of study that is relevant to arts organisations, creative industries, cultural policy and, increasingly, to economic policy for growth and development. It began modestly in the 1960s with an interest in the economic analysis of the finance of museums and the live performing arts, and has spread and evolved into a broader analysis of the cultural or creative industries and their role in the creative economy. This economy is now dominated by the digital revolution in the use of knowledge and information, and its distribution via the Internet; it is shaped by the need to foster creativity and to understand the production and consumption of creative goods and services. While some economists hold that the digital economy does not call for a new kind of economics, nevertheless, new concepts have been adopted with the title ‘platform economics’ and extended universally. Cultural economics has long wrestled with topics to which ordinary economics did not seem fully applicable (for instance, understanding economic incentives for artists and other creators) and has accordingly developed an understanding of public policy issues concerning the development and support of the creative industries. Cultural economics now offers expertise in the analysis of markets for a wide range of creative products, ranging from art to digital television, which were reflected in the topics covered in the second edition of this Handbook. The third edition now takes matters a step further, with a good proportion of the chapters dealing with the economic theory and its application in the digital economy. However, there are timeless topics in cultural economics. Research on the economic characteristics of production and consumption of the performing arts, museums and built heritage on topics such as such as demand, elasticity, pricing, costs, market structure, finance and regulation continue to attract cultural economists. Some of these art forms – even the most traditional such as opera and museums – have been able to embrace new technologies, not so much on the production side (though that too) as in facilitating their ability to reach wider audiences. In addition, there has been an increased amount of economic research on the cultural industries (broadcasting, film, publishing and sound recording, and video games) and on the impact of the creative industries on economic development in cities and districts, including through festivals and cultural tourism. In addition to the public finance of the older arts, regulation by governments continues to play an important role in the creative economy in relation to heritage and the media, and through copyright law and artists’ rights legislation. This book covers all these topics.

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Edited by Ruth Towse and Trilce Navarrete Hernández

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Rebecca S. Eisenberg

An anticommons is a fragmented allocation of property rights in which resources are prone to underuse because it is costly to assemble necessary permissions to put resources to use. The more rights holders and the more varied their entitlements, the more challenging it is to avoid waste through bargaining. The patent system continuously creates new rights for new claimants, with limited opportunity to establish consensus valuations as technology changes. Patent aggregation might seem like an effective market solution to the problem of fragmented ownership, yet the rise of patent aggregators seems to have done more to reduce costs of assertion by patent owners than to reduce costs of clearing rights by technology users. The result may be a greater risk of underuse as subsequent innovators need to evaluate and clear more rights that they might otherwise have ignored with little risk of assertion in the absence of aggregation

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Joel Waldfogel

Copyright provides monopoly grants for creators, and these rights have traditionally been protected by a combination of law and technology. Recent technological changes associated with digitization have undermined effective copyright protection by facilitating piracy. At the same time, other aspects of digitization have reduced the cost of bringing new products to market. Despite collapsing revenue to some industries, such as recorded music, the number of new creative products – in music, movies, television, and books - has risen sharply. By many measures, the value of the new products to consumers is also high. Despite the understandable concerns of many in these industries, we are currently experiencing a golden age for new

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Sean A. Pager

Does copyright foster the development of creative industries in developing countries? To answer, this chapter explores case studies from Nigeria, India, and China. It argues that copyright’s decentralized, market-driven incentives and allocative efficiencies offer distinct advantages over alternative models such as state patronage and commons-based development. The chapter emphasizes that copyright need not be embraced as an all-or-nothing proposition. Copyright norms can govern some aspects of creative industry operations, while remaining absent in other domains. Thus, high levels of piracy in developing countries are not necessarily incompatible with copyright. As industries develop, however, copyright’s benefits become more salient, and the logic of formalization exerts a gravitational pull. The chapter also examines the interplay between copyright and cultural diversity. It argues that the causal relationships here are complex and ambiguous. It is far from clear, however, that copyright markets are intrinsically hostile to diversity, and copyright’s absence poses its own set of concerns.

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David L. Schwartz and Ted Sichelman

This chapter provides a roadmap of the principal data sources for the various forms of intellectual property protection. We first explain what data is available about patents, copyrights, trademarks, and other types of intellectual property, and where to find it. Then we identify and analyze data sources specifically relating to intellectual property licensing and litigation—growing areas of research by scholars and lawyers.