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In this chapter, we discuss the issue of market power in the online video field, which is arguably the most troubling aspect of this emerging online video system. We analyze the options of dealing with market power of online video platforms. They include the delegation of regulation to the industry; regulation as a public utility; provision by a public enterprise; licensing and registration; ownership restrictions; limits to foreign ownership and provision; antitrust breakup, functional separations, and unbundling; and interconnection. We concluded with a recommended “Open Video System” based on access rights to infrastructure and platform elements, where significant media market power (SMMP) exist. Such access would be accomplished through API software interfaces that must be offered by such platforms. (APIs), a way to let software by other parties interoperate with the platform’s software. Conditions of access would be governed by the non-discriminatory principle of “most favored nation,” subject to arbitration by a self-administrative process. A key role would be played by the personal information management curators. They would engage, in the consumer’s behalf, in the finding, selecting, and screening of appropriate content and infrastructure, as well as in the protection of personal data, They would be able to supply their own algorithms. Such an Open Video System does not solve all policy problems, and it needs to be limited when it comes to content or data. But it reduces the problem of market power of the platforms and its global extension. It will create, without breakups, a more competitive video cloud market. In doing so it reduces the need for detailed governmental control and oversight.
This chapter summarizes several of the analyses and empirical findings from other chapters: economic and technological drivers of change, new types of content, the emergence of video cloud providers, their market power, and their impact on other media industries and on society. This leads to a number of business and policy strategies, and to a recommended access arrangement.
The Lisbon Treaty consolidated, clarified and shifted the division of European Union competences in matters of criminal law. These are the developments that this chapter explores. Starting with the legal framework introduced by the Lisbon treaty, the chapter lays down both the conferred competences and the legal limits to them. The chapter then turns to the specifics of the Union’s procedural, institutional and substantive competences, elaborating upon the interplay between the competences in law and jurisprudence. To augment those parts of the legal texts that are not exhaustive, the chapter concludes by reflecting on the Court of Justice’s post-Lisbon jurisprudence on criminal competences, in which the Court has been attuning its doctrines to the challenges arising from the Lisbon legal framework for criminal justice.
Patrick Minford and David Meenagh
In this book, the themes of my earlier book, Should Britain Leave the EU? (Minford et al., 2015), are pulled together to discuss how we should follow up with post-Brexit policies, now that Brexit has finally taken place. ‘What should Britain do, having left the EU?’ This is what this book aims to answer. As before, I will rely heavily on research that my co-authors and I have done, mostly now in Cardiff over the last 20 years, building on earlier work in Liverpool over the previous 20.