This timely collection will be an immensely valuable resource for academics, policy-makers, those commercially involved in the betting and gaming sectors as well as the interested layman.
Browse by title
Building on the pioneering work by the Nobel Memorial Laureate, John Nash, Professor Thomson's reserch review discusses a broad selection of seminal articles which analyse and discuss bargaining and the theory of cooperative games.
A Rational Choice Approach
Syed Mansoob Murshed
This book explores the pre-conditions for conflict in terms of growth failure and critically appraises the greed and grievance theories common to conflict literature. It is argued that various institutional mechanisms of restraint that can be labeled the ‘social contract’ are crucial for violent conflict avoidance. The reasons underpinning the instability of treaties ending civil wars, post-conflict reconstruction issues, liberal peace theory, and how globalization and conflict relate are also examined.
Roger A. McCain
Game theory is useful in understanding collective human activity as the outcome of interactive decisions. In recent years it has become a more prominent aspect of research and applications in public policy disciplines such as economics, philosophy, management and political science, and in work within public policy itself. Here Roger McCain makes use of the analytical tools of game theory with the pragmatic purpose of identifying problems and exploring potential solutions in public policy.
This unique book presents various ways in which evolutionary theory can contribute to the analysis of key legal-philosophical problems. Wojciech Zaluski explores three central questions; the ontological question – what is the nature of law?; the teleological-axiological question – what are the main values to be realized by law?; the normativity question, which has two aspects; normative: what explains the fact that legal norms provide reasons for action?, and motivational: what explains the fact that humans can be motivated by legal norms? It is argued that evolutionary theory suggests non-trivial answers to these questions, and that these answers can become the building blocks of a new – evolutionary – paradigm in legal philosophy.
A Multidisciplinary Approach
Ernst ten Heuvelhof, Martin de Jong, Mirjam Kars and Helen Stout
This in-depth book explains how institutional changes such as the privatization and liberalization of network industries, for example transport, energy or telecommunications, can frequently be disappointing. The expected benefits such as lower prices, innovation and better services fail to materialize, often because the number of competitors is low. The authors demonstrate how strategic actor behaviour of one or more of the firms involved can help explain these disappointing results.
Edited by Carlo Carraro and Vito Fragnelli
This book summarises the latest achievements of researchers involved in the application of game theory to the analysis of environmental matters. It provides an overview of different methods and applications, and gives the reader new insights on the solutions to complex environmental problems. The authors investigate various game theoretic approaches, including cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, and analyse both dynamic and static games. They illustrate the application of these approaches to global and local environmental problems, and present novel but effective tools to support environmental policy making. In particular, they focus on three important issues; climate negotiations and policy, the sharing of environmental costs, and environmental management and pollution control.
The book investigates various strategies to provide countries with an incentive to accede, agree and comply to an international environmental agreement (IEA). Finus shows that by integrating real world restrictions into a model, game theory is a powerful tool for explaining the divergence between ‘first-best’ policy recommendations and ‘second-best’ designs of actual IEAs. For instance he explains why (inefficient) uniform emission reduction quotas have played such a prominent role in past IEAs despite economists’ recommendations for the use of (efficient) market-based instruments as for example emission targets and permits. Moreover, it is stated, that a single, global IEA on climate is not necessarily the best strategy and small coalitions may enjoy a higher stability and may achieve more.
Theory and Practice, Problems and Paradoxes
Dan S. Felsenthal and Moshé Machover
This book is the first of its kind: a monograph devoted to a systematic critical examination and exposition of the theory of a priori voting power. This important branch of social-choice theory overlaps with game theory and is concerned with the ability of members in bodies that make yes or no decisions by vote to affect the outcome. The book includes, among other topics, a reasoned distinction between two fundamental types of voting power, the authors' discoveries on the paradoxes of voting power, and a novel analysis of decision rules that admit abstention.