Do institutions matter in economic theory? Or is the economic analysis of institutions a distraction from the most important action? Indeed, does Vernon Smith’s notion of the “institution-free core” of formal economic theory encompass that most important action? To explore this question, this book opens with an informal tour of the economics of system design out of which an economics of adaptation ultimately emerged. The book then offers explorations, via the application of the economics of adaptation in both law and economics relating to how parties manage relationships within the firm, within the context of long-term contracts, and, most vividly, within the context of antitrust conspiracy.
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Dean V. Williamson
J. Harold Mulherin
This significant collection of articles comprises seminal works in recent empirical research on mergers and acquisitions. The papers provide a detailed analysis of fundamental questions such as the sources of gains in mergers and acquisitions, the role of activists in the takeover process, the existence of merger waves, the relevance of auction models in corporate takeovers and the measurement of bidder returns.
A Critique of Shareholder Value
Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebérioux
Recent corporate governance scandals have brought to the fore the inherent contradictions of a capitalism dominated by financial markets. This challenging book by Michel Aglietta and Antoine Rebérioux argues that capitalism’s basic premise – that companies must be managed in the sole interest of their shareholders – is incongruent with the current environment of liquid markets, profit-hungry investors and chronic financial instability. The authors advocate rather that a company should be managed as an institution where common objectives are developed for all stakeholders, and that this democratic principle should be extended to the management of collective savings to reduce macro-financial instability. These two conditions, they contend, could make contemporary capitalism a vehicle for social progress.