This comprehensive research review recaps major literary contributions to the economic theory of incentives. These carefully selected papers, both classic and contemporary, analyse collective decision problems in the context of asymmetric information, moral hazard and incomplete contracting. This review is an essential tool for any serious scholar and student in the field.
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Design, Bargaining, and the Law
Zenichi Shishido, Munetaka Fukuda and Masato Umetani
Although they have the potential to create synergies, joint ventures by their nature contain inherent risk. Therefore, each partner in a joint venture needs to incentivize each other in order to maximize their own payoff. Extensive pre-contractual and post-contractual bargaining is essential. This book provides successful bargaining strategies from the point of view of each partner company. Using game theoretical framework to analyze joint venture strategy, it describes practical and legal issues that arise when creating synergies and incentive bargaining in a joint venture. With a particular focus on intellectual property law, including analysis based on many real cases, the book covers issues relating to creating synergies, corporate law issues of conflicts of interest, and antitrust law issues relating to cooperation between independent companies.
Roger A. McCain
This book provides a critical, selective review of concepts from game theory and their applications in public policy, and further suggests some modifications for some of the models (chiefly in cooperative game theory) to improve their applicability to economics and public policy.
Michael Finus and Alejandro Caparrós
Key environmental issues, such as biodiversity and climate change, have in recent years become more pressing than ever. Where the critical papers in the early 1990s explained the difficulties of cooperation in tackling transboundary environmental problems, later works have analyzed the various alternatives, and increased our understanding of various institutional designs and negotiation protocols' impact on the success of cooperation. This research review identifies the most important articles on the game theoretic analysis of international environmental cooperation to both confront the cooperative and non-cooperative approaches to this, and demonstrate the diversity of methods used to analyze international environmental agreements.
Edited by Frank Whelon Wayman, Paul R. Williamson, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Solomon Polachek
It is a puzzle that while academic research has increased in specialization, the important and complex problems facing humans urgently require a synthesis of understanding. This unique collaboration attempts to address such a problem by bringing together a host of prominent scholars from across the sciences to offer new insights into predicting the future. They demonstrate that long-term trends and short-term incentives need to be understood in order to adopt effective policies, or even to comprehend where we currently stand and the sort of future that awaits us.
Economic Action as Imperfect Cooperation
Roger A. McCain
The objectives of this book are twofold. Firstly, it proposes that economics should be defined as a study of imperfect cooperation. Secondly, it elucidates the continuities that extend from classical political economy through the neoclassical, Keynesian, and modern economics of the twenty-first century.
Theory, Corporations and East Asia. Selected Papers of Masahiko Aoki
Matthew O. Jackson and Yves Zenou
This comprehensive research review brings together important contributions providing fundamental economic analyses of social networks and the central roles they play in many facets of our lives.
Building on the pioneering work by the Nobel Memorial Laureate, John Nash, Professor Thomson's reserch review discusses a broad selection of seminal articles which analyse and discuss bargaining and the theory of cooperative games.