Already in 1919, the Paris Convention required a Certificate of Airworthiness (CofA) for each individual aircraft eligible for international air navigation. With the development of industry and therefore construction of several aircraft conformant with the same design, it became usual for the aviation authorities to issue Type Certificates (TC) approving the design and reducing the burden to test each individual produced aircraft. After production, maintaining airworthiness becomes the responsibility of the operator, although based on instructions delivered by the manufacturer. In principle the same processes apply to Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), bearing in mind however that, until 2017, no competent aviation authority had published a comprehensive airworthiness code applicable to UAS. Special conditions hence are necessary. Furthermore, the formal airworthiness processes are disproportionate in the ‘open’ and ‘specific’ category, where in fact no CofA is mandatory.
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Anna Masutti and Filippo Tomasello
Luís Silva Morais and Lúcio Tomé Feteira
Together with its undisputed economic relevance, complexity is undoubtedly one of the most salient features of the financial sector. Complexity bequeaths the adoption of a specific regulatory setting, as was the case with the creation of the Banking Union. In fact, deficient and inadequate regulation and supervision of the financial sector – largely due to an insufficient outside perception of risks incurred by financial institutions – coupled with a selective application of competition rules ranked highly amidst the reasons for the 2007–09 financial crisis. Consequently, it would seem that the rethinking of the overall regulatory framework should be complemented by a reflection on the role of antitrust enforcement in the financial sector. This chapter builds upon the latter premise and focuses on a specific type of antitrust intervention – the prohibition of abuse of dominance – and its interaction with the regulation and supervision of the financial (banking) sector. This reflection takes into account the recent evolution of competition rules in the financial sector in order to tentatively sketch a reappraisal of abuse regulation in the financial sector resorting to a notorious example: that of inter-change fees for card-based payment transactions.
This chapter proposes that new competition regimes, particularly those of developing and underdeveloped economies, should take advantage of more amenable and more familiar legal tools such as the doctrine of unconscionability in their abuse of dominance assessments. This is because the pure economic models mainly deployed by the more mature regimes might be unsuitable for the less developed systems at least in the early years. This chapter will therefore explore how the doctrine can be infused into their competition laws, serving either as a major basis for assessment or as a stopgap while they gain concrete knowledge of the true economic and developmental implications of applying complex economic models in abuse of dominance cases.
Article 42 of the ECT regulates the procedure of amending treaty provisions. The author analyses both formal and substantial aspects, in order to provide a clear framework for ECT interpreters. Moreover, the analysis sheds lights on the 1998 amendment of the ECT, the so-called Trade Amendment. Pictured at the time of the entry into force of the World Trade Organization (WTO), with the Uruguay Round, the ECT Trade Amendment embraced in the treaty regime relevant principles in multilateral trade and, in turn, expanded the scope of the agreement, in order to cover trade in energy-related spheres.
Review of innovation related typologies and models analytical framework. Introduction to innovation and patent economics at micro and macro levels. Overview of the multi-national patent system and its institutional structure.
Edited by Charles H. Matthews and Eric W. Liguori
Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi
This chapter explores some of the means through which algorithms and artificial intelligence may be used to dampen competition. We note how algorithmic pricing could, under certain market conditions, lead to conscious parallelism and higher prices. We also identify some of the legal and enforcement challenges raised by algorithmic tacit collusion.
Matthew Hodgson and Vee Vian Thien
This chapter critically examines the appellate option. In arbitration, the finality of the award is typically prioritized over correctness, so that the parties enjoy the advantages of cost effectiveness and expedience. However, it is arguable that the balance should be re-assessed in relation to investor-state disputes as opposed to purely commercial arbitrations, as the former involve acts of government and questions of public interest. This chapter provides an overview of the perceived shortcomings of the present system, a summary of the EU’s proposed reforms and evaluates how far the introduction of an appeal mechanism would address concerns over investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) such as predictability and consistency of awards.
Andrey A. Konoplyanik
The Annex examines transit issues between Russia and the EU and the role of the Energy Charter instruments in minimizing such transit risks. It starts with an analysis of historical development of Soviet/Russian gas supplies to Europe – evolution of its contractual structure based on Groningen (Dutch) model of LTGEC and the role of transit, which has increasingly evolved after dissolution of the COMECON and the USSR. It identifies three major components of transit risk in the cross-border gas value chain: legal/regulatory, technical and political, while the first two have an objective character non-dependent of the name of transit state. It distinguishes two zones of new transit risks – within and outside the EU – in gas value chain of Russian gas supplies to Europe; arguing that new transit risks outside the EU is the result of the move from political to market-based pricing and to ‘European formulas’ within the CIS, while new transit risks within the EU resulted from liberalization trends within and enlargement of the EU energy market. The Annex considers which international law instruments are best available for regulating transit of energy: GATT/WTO or ECT and compares GATT Art V ;Freedom of Transit’ and ECT Art 7 ‘Transit’ (transit through fixed infrastructure), including its intended strengthening through the draft Energy Charter Protocol on Transit. The Annex examines in detail key debated transit issues and draft solutions within Energy Charter framework, including: definition of available capacity; domestic, import/export and transit tariffs; conciliatory procedure; congestion management; contractual mismatch; and draft Transit Protocol implementation inside the EU. Finally, the Annex examines which transit risks ECT does not address and why.