The chapter addresses the magnitude of prostitution throughout 39 countries, namely the EU-28 plus Norway and 10 non-EU transition countries, as of the year 2010. According to the authors’ literature review concerning both non-coerced and coerced prostitution, empirical studies prove very scarce. Scant data from representative household surveys on male sexual behaviour document the demand side. Data sources are collected on the supply side in order to design three series of estimates using the following measurements: two from HIV prevalence among female sex workers, two from international NGOs and two from victims of sexual exploitation trafficking. Estimates are tested with an OLS model, an ordered probit and country ranking with respect to GDP per capita, legislation, scale, supply-side and demand-side variables, as well as the share of sex work in the female labour force. Estimates are checked against national accounts adjustments for illegal production on the supply side and consumption expenditure on the demand side, using an average price for sexual services and related earnings; neither a profession nor an occupation, prostitution is an economic activity and sex workers belong to informal employment. Four main findings are the assessment for most likely Estimates, the asymmetry of prostitution regimes regarding the magnitude of sex work, the premium in earnings from prostitution and the inclusion of sex workers into informal employment.
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Alex Maritz presents the argument that entrepreneurs need grit, and EE has a major role to play in its development. Bringing a wealth of corporate and entrepreneurial experience to EE, Maritz operates at the intersection of current ideas and his students’ immediate futures. At this place, theory for theory’s sake will not suffice. Maritz describes a range of learning processes that correspond to several types of grit to build a strong argument for the essential nature of one’s grit in the process of learning by doing. Beyond developing his arguments, Maritz pragmatically acknowledges the challenges to developing grit, both in terms of student perceptions and institutional norms.
This chapter tests the viability of the permissions to intern under IHL by comparing them to the requirements of international human rights law on deprivation of liberty. It creates a three-pronged test: in order for the permission to intern under IHL to be in compliance with the requirements of IHRL, such permission shall (i) be based on a legal basis established in law and prescribing (ii) the permissible grounds and (iii) the relevant procedure. The chapter concludes that the IHL permissions to intern prisoners of war and protected persons comply with IHRL and amount to legal bases. By contrast, the absence of strong permission within the law of NIAC means the absence of a legal basis to intern in the sense of IHRL. The chapter therefore concludes that internment in NIAC needs to find another source for a legal basis.
This chapter deals with the question of the authority to intern persons during non-international armed conflict. It offers a new perspective on a subject that has been largely discussed, by offering a comprehensive overview of existing practice and providing definite evidence that the law of NIAC does not contain any rule that can amount to an authorization to intern in NIAC. Through an in-depth review of both conventional and customary law, and of the difference between explicit and implicit permissions, this chapter demonstrates that, first, there is no explicit permission in the law governing NIAC, and, second, that none of the arguments often presented in favour of an ‘inherent’ permission holds. It shows that States and scholars often confuse lex lata and lex ferenda: many of the arguments used today are indeed of a lex ferenda nature.
This chapter deals with the question of the authority to intern prisoners of war during international armed conflict. It demonstrates that Article 21 of GCIII provides Detaining Powers the permission to intern enemy prisoners of war, and implicitly rejects the need for any additional procedure beyond that of removing any doubt on the status of the prisoner of war. The chapter shows that the permission is status based and can be applied collectively to all enemy prisoners of war. It further shows that the permission’s scope may nevertheless be limited: in cases where the Detaining Power is unable or unwilling to respect the obligations contained in GCIII and protecting prisoners of war, the permission to intern may be invalidated.
This chapter deals with the question of the authority to intern protected persons during international armed conflict. It shows that Articles 41–42 and 78 of GCIV function as an authorization to intern protected civilians, in a State’s own territory and in occupied territory respectively. It further shows that the permission includes the grounds for interning such persons as well as some procedural guarantees. It adds that the permission disappears in accordance with the temporal scope of application of GCIV. In all situations, the underlying justification for the end of the permission to intern lies in the fact that the military necessity of resorting to internment has disappeared. Accordingly, not only does that mean that no additional individual shall be interned on the basis of Articles 41–42 and 78 of GCIV after such respective moments, but also that the permission to maintain in internment those already so confined is terminated.
This chapter tests the viability of the permissions to target under IHL by comparing them to the requirements of international human rights law on deprivation of life. It shows that the requirement that the right to life be protected by law does not include the obligation of having a legal basis authorizing the deprivation of life, but instead that each deprivation of life shall comply with the applicable legal framework constraining the use of lethal force. It shows that the ‘in-built flexibility’ provided by the prohibition of arbitrariness enshrined in the right to life allows for the strong permissions contained under IHL to be taken into account in interpreting the right to life. Built on an extensive analysis of existing case-law and practice, the chapter concludes that a weak permission, accompanied by compliance with the rules of IHL, is sufficient to preclude a violation of the right to life.
This chapter offers a thorough analysis of the various rules and principles under IHL which are often considered as being of a permissive nature. It demonstrates that IHL contains a strong permission to directly target certain persons or categories of persons. This is the case, in IAC, of members of the enemy armed forces and in both IAC and NIAC, for individual civilians who directly participate in hostilities. This is also the case, in NIAC, for members of an organized non-State armed group, i.e. those members within the non-State party to the NIAC that have a continuous combat function. By contrast, the chapter shows that IHL does not provide such strong permission for members of a non-State armed group party to a NIAC to directly target members of a State armed forces. Here, IHL only contains a weak permission, i.e. the absence of a prohibition.
A variety of synonyms has been used to phrase the question of the nature of IHL: does IHL provide a ‘legal basis’, a ‘right’, an ‘authority’, an ‘authorization’, a ‘power’, a ‘permission’, or a ‘licence’ to resort to certain conducts during armed conflict? But is saying that ‘IHL provides a legal basis’ really the same as saying that ‘it contains a permission’ or even ‘it contains a right’? Using deontic logic, this chapter presents the notion of permission in legal theory, provides definitions for this polysemous term and explains the different degrees of permissiveness. It also shows that, when discussing the permissiveness of IHL, one cannot use the mere absence of prohibition to conclude to the existence of an authorization to do something, but rather should be looking for ‘strong permissions’.
Aljosha Karim Schapals
Automated journalism, or robo-journalism, is a relatively novel, but growing phenomenon in which journalistic texts are created based on set and clearly defined algorithms. Such output requires clean, structured and reliable data to safeguard the accuracy of the generated text. At this stage in its evolution, the use of automated journalism in newsrooms is still somewhat limited to sports and financial news. However, given the increased sophistication of the technology, future uptakes are to be expected. This shift raises pressing questions for journalistic accountability, ethics and transparency, and has led to concerns about the future of journalistic work if human journalists are potentially replaceable in beats prone to automation. This chapter discusses the value of artificial intelligence for the creative economy, and journalism in particular, and provides an evidence-based assessment for such predictions. It further contributes topical insights into the future of a creative industry characterised by precarious employment patterns.