This chapter takes up questions about the justification of the state’s treatment of charities from the liberal perspective that has too often neglected such questions. It does so via a critical examination of Matthew Harding’s recent book, Charity Law and the Liberal State. The chapter argues that Harding does not do enough to address and understand the particular ways in which the liberal state, with an eye to the value of autonomy, promotes the pursuit of charitable purposes. It also questions whether Harding defends sufficiently his chosen methodology of seeking to interpret charity law ‘from within’, and it worries that Harding’s treatment of political purposes reveals that Harding’s primary concern is not charity law per se but rather the duties and responsibilities of the liberal state. The chapter also argues that Harding fails to explain why the state, via charity law, promotes only autonomy-enhancing purposes that are pursued altruistically.
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Towards a New Leadership in Global Investment Governance?
Edited by Julien Chaisse
Rule of law is commonly believed to be a prerequisite for long-term sustainable growth of a modern economy, where uniform and formal rules apply to all parties in predictable and non-discriminatory ways. During its economic reforms in the past four decades, China has relied upon many alternative arrangements that have served the main function of providing incentives for different groups of economic agents, but are not in line with the spirit of rule of law. Consequently, an important topic for future research is to test the validity of this argument: will China be able to maintain its long-term growth without fundamental changes in its institutional environment? Alternatively, will substitution mechanisms continue to induce effort and promote growth effectively? Another possibility is that we may have missed the improvement of rule of law during China’s reform era, perhaps due to lack of accurate measures. Thus, how can we better measure the institutional quality of various Chinese regions? And finally, what explains evolution of economic institutions in China and how does it relate to that of political institutions? Answers to these questions will undoubtedly help shed light on our understanding of institutional evolution in general.
Tao Xu and Nan Yang
This chapter analyses the history of and legislation process of the Chinese police system and police power. After describing the development of Chinese police from 1949, the emergence and improvement of the relevant law have always been important in shaping the policy mechanism of the police. Since 1976, a reform agenda has been implemented. Chinese police officers were given more responsibility to promote new regulations and laws and were given the role of guardian. With the rapid growth of the global economy and technology, China's internal and external security situation has changed considerably, and non-traditional security issues are regarded as a threat to society. Hence, the Police Law of 1995 requires further modification and improvement. In the acknowledgement that continuous legal reform will be necessary in the future, an amendment of the People's Police Law was would be placed on the legislative planning list.
This chapter traces how scholars have moved from theories of policymaking as decision based on systematic choice to incrementalism, and from there to post-incrementalism. First, the tension between policymaking as decision/choice for a single decisionmaker and as incrementalist heuristics in a multi-actor political arena is spelled out. Next, the chapter turns to works that have amended incrementalism to account for longer-term nonincremental change. Subsequently, it discusses “neo-incrementalist” successors to incrementalist policy design heuristics. After dealing with the shift from an optimistic view of incrementalism as embodying “the intelligence of democracy” to a tragic view of policymaking as a “troubled attempt to understand and shape society”, the final section turns to the still contentious issue of limits to responsible policy change under democratic governance, especially under contemporary trends, the “Great Regression”, which appear to threaten both the intelligence of democracy and democracy itself.
Ana E. Juncos
Since the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in 1999, the European Union (EU) has developed the capabilities to plan and conduct civilian crisis missions that cover a wide range of areas, from policing to border monitoring to judicial reform. This chapter seeks to examine progress in this area by focusing on its achievements so far, and especially its contribution to the role of the EU as an international actor (the good); the operational and capability problems it has faced in implementing CSDP civilian missions (the bad); and the politics of civilian crisis management (the ugly). Because of the political nature of civilian CSDP, it has remained a contested policy since its origins. In particular, this chapter focuses on three types of political contestation, namely intergovernmental, bureaucratic and local politics, and how this has affected the implementation of civilian CSDP.
Given that institutions are “humanly devised” (North, 1991, p. 97), what determines which institutions are chosen? Different societies have different understandings of how the world works and consequently tend to choose different institutions even when pursuing similar purposes. Therefore, culture matters, as culture determines the mental models that people use to understand and interpret the world, including beliefs, values and preferences. Yet culture has been relatively absent from economic inquiry, even among economists that focus on institutional economics. In this chapter, I review an emerging literature that focuses on understanding the interrelationship between culture and institutions. This literature shows that not only does culture influence which institutions different societies choose and how they work, but also that institutions can subsequently feedback and affect culture. That is, culture and institutions coevolve. This literature is still in the formative stages and there are many research opportunities for the interested researcher.
Kyle J. Mayer
Transaction cost economics has led to a variety of insights into how firms govern transactions across firm boundaries. Research in this area has focused primarily on the attributes of the transaction as drivers of governance choice. Additional work is needed to better understand how cognitive and contextual factors influence governance choice and ultimately transaction and firm performance.
Though pathbreaking scholarship has placed collective action problems at the core of economic development, our knowledge is still incomplete about the sources of stable collective action. This chapter focuses on continuing questions surrounding the role of collective action in the shaping of government policy. To what extent do informal norms of cooperation allow citizens to act collectively to influence government? Organizations, particularly political parties, can solve citizen collective action problems. When do policy-based – programmatic – parties emerge that allow for collective action around policy issues? State capacity is most accurately seen as a quality of public sector organization: can public sector organizations mobilize public sector workers in the collective task of serving the public interest? However, governments take starkly different attitudes towards improving state capacity. What explains this variation? This chapter suggests that these questions should be at the core of future research on institutions and development.
Everaldo Lamprea and Angela M. Páez
This chapter presents the results of an empirical study that systematized environmental judicial opinions handed down by Colombia’s highest administrative Court – Consejo de Estado – over a period of 16 years (2000–2016). The authors and a team of coders systematized, using state-of-the art content analysis methodologies more than 250 opinions – popular actions – handed down by Colombia’s highest administrative court. The results presented in this chapter show the most important trends of collective environmental litigation in Colombia: types of plaintiffs and defendants; type of environmental resources involved in the case; plaintiffs’ success rates; most litigious regions and cities; and overall effects of economic incentives on the type of litigation, among several other subjects. This chapter concludes that collective environmental litigation has been instrumental to protect environmental resources in Colombia, one the most biodiverse countries in the world. The chapter concludes that the elimination in 2011 of the economic incentive in favour of litigants did not favour public interest litigation.