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A basic function of welfare states is guaranteeing social protection to all citizens. European citizenship aims to create a level playing field for citizens of all Member States. In the process, some categories of citizens tend to be overlooked, or even deprived of previous rights. In this chapter, we focus on young adults as a vulnerable category of citizens. They appear to suffer the most from high unemployment rates, and are encouraged in the Europe 2020 strategy to be mobile to explore opportunities outside their country. However, the rights of young, mobile Europeans are not per se guaranteed if they migrate. A critical analysis of the Youth on the Move program, and recent National Reform Programmes of Member States identifies key discrepancies between EU goals for young adults’ mobility and their social, political, legal and economic position.

This chapter analyses why intra-European migration remains rather low. Traditional migration models based on ‘push–pull’ factors attempt to explain migration from an economic perspective while relying on strict assumptions of individuals’ rationality and perfect information. The chapter integrates ‘push–pull’ factors that stimulate migration with ‘stay–stay away’ factors, which discourage migration. It suggests that migration decision is based on an evaluation of ‘push–pull’ incentives with regard to ‘stay–stay away’ incentives. The results confirm that ‘stay–-stay away’ factors contribute to the explanation of migration intentions. Individuals who score higher on the ’stay–stay away’ index are less likely to envisage migrating at some point in the future. Including both ‘push–pull’ and ‘stay–stay away’ factors in a single model confirms our supposition as to the complementary nature of both groups of predictors and points to the usefulness of a comprehensive ‘push–pull’-’stay–stay away’ framework. Furthermore, our results show that young Europeans are more likely to consider migration for non-economic reasons, while at the same time signalling reluctance to give up their economic security at home.

In this chapter we reflect on the question: Who or what exactly is the patent office? And how best do we secure its judicial proficiency and independence? We offer a framework for assessing this question, after cutting through the vast morass of often confusing case law in this regard that has failed to draw a conceptually sound distinction between the judicial, the quasi-judicial and the administrative. We argue that agencies such as the patent office tasked with a high level of adjudicatory functions are predominantly ‘judicial’ in character and ought to be therefore categorized as ‘Adjudicative Regulators’. As such they are to be vested with a significant degree of judicial competence and independence. We offer some broad suggestions in this regard. Our frame is likely to be useful for characterising other regulatory agencies with predominant judicial functions, and could well prove instructive for agencies in other countries with legal regimes similar to that of India.

State lawmakers looking to increase public university accountability have implemented policies which aim to monitor, reward and sanction schools based on completion rates. These policies have mainly emerged as performance-based funding (PBF) policies, which tie state appropriations to institutional performance and student outcomes. As of 2014, 26 states adopted a form of performance-based funding policy, with four more programs awaiting implementation. Despite the intuitive appeal of performance-based funding policies, higher education scholars have debated the degree to which these policies accomplish the intended goals. The scholarly record includes both studies that find PBF policies to be successful and studies that find no evidence of effectiveness. The existence of findings on both sides has led many to describe the body of work as ‘mixed’, with no real sense of whether these findings are trending in a particular direction. In an effort to improve our ability to speak holistically about this body of work, we conduct a meta-analysis which aims to aggregate and analyse the quantitative findings on the effect of performance funding policies on public four-year and two-year university outcomes.