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Edited by Paul Roberts and Michael Stockdale

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The Scales of Weighing Regulatory Costs

Technology, Geography, and Time

Jamison E. Colburn

This book examines the calculation and evaluation of regulatory costs by regulators in accordance with a legislative mandate. A serious limitation in that enterprise, the possibility of technological change and innovation, often compromises those efforts and has long been under-appreciated in standard ‘cost-benefit analysis.’ Regulators who study the inducement of innovation and the avoidance of regulatory costs by the regulated often find significant cost-saving opportunities, leading to more stringent and more effective risk governance. Ultimately, the weighing of costs in this more elaborate model is more than simple welfare maximization. It views regulatory costs as important to society for a range of reasons, some grounded in fairness and some in deliberative process values, as a society seeks to minimize all costs over time.
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Jamison E. Colburn

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Paul Roberts and Michael Stockdale

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Edited by Paul Roberts and Michael Stockdale

Forensic science evidence plays a pivotal role in modern criminal proceedings. Yet such evidence poses intense practical and theoretical challenges. It can be unreliable or misleading and has been associated with miscarriages of justice. In this original and insightful book, a global team of prominent scholars and practitioners explore the contemporary challenges of forensic science evidence and expert witness testimony from a variety of theoretical, practical and jurisdictional perspectives. Chapters encompass the institutional organisation of forensic science, its procedural regulation, evaluation and reform, and brim with comparative insight.
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Jamison E. Colburn

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John Morley

Why are investment companies are regulated so differently from every other kind of company? The multitude of other companies across our diverse spectrum of business endeavors—from software design to clothing retail to food service, and so forth—are regulated by a generic body of securities regulations. What exactly makes an investment company so different from every other kind of company that it alone deserves special securities regulation? The chapter concludes that, whatever the historical rationales for investment company regulation, the most compelling rationale for investment company regulation today is an investment company’s unique organizational structure. An investment fund almost always has a separate legal existence and a separate set of owners from the managers who control it. A fund investor thus relates to her managers in a radically different way from an investor in every other kind of company.

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Alan Palmiter

Chapter 5 attempts to compile an investor profile that describes who mutual fund investors are. It concludes that this portrait of investors, painted by academic and governmental studies, is disturbing. Fund shareholders, who are in charge of making their own investment decisions, are ignorant of important characteristics of the funds in which they invest, inattentive to risks, and insensitive to fund fees. The chapter ends with a “trillion-dollar question”: whether the legal regime charged with protecting fund investors and ensuring the viability of our private retirement system is up to the task.

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Anita K. Krug

The chapter contemplates possible ways to improve the governance of mutual funds, focusing specifically on a new model. In this new governance model, multiple funds in a common family are not managed by a single investment adviser but rather by numerous advisers, each managing one or a small number of funds within the organization. The chapter contends that although the new model produces novel risks, there are reasons to believe that it is as least as effective as the traditional model, and may in fact be superior in some ways. Specifically, because the new model produces fewer sources of conflicts of interest than the traditional one, it may strengthen the board’s ability to uphold its fiduciary duties to fund investors.