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Evolving Disputes, Expanding Options
Edited by Truong T. Tran, John B. Welfield and Thuy T. Le
John B. Welfield and Le Thuy Trang
Interstate conflict, in the view of one-third of the global decision-makers and experts assembled to compile the World Economic Forum 2015 Global Risks Report, was the most probable serious danger facing the East Asia-Pacific region over the coming decade.1 A Pew Research Center global opinion poll conducted in the spring of 2014 found that people in eight of the 11 Asian countries surveyed expressed fears about possible military conflict over territorial disputes involving the People’s Republic of China and its neighbors. In China itself, more than six in every ten citizens expressed similar concerns. Two-thirds of Americans in 2014 also feared that intensifying territorial disputes between China and its neighbors could spark an armed conflict.2 Although the World Economic Forum 2017 Global Risks Report considered such conflict as a decreasing risk in terms of likelihood and impact,3 majorities in China, Japan and several other East Asian nations remained concerned about territorial tensions and the strategic drama being played out between the United States and China on land and at sea across the region had begun to fuel fears that the “Pacific century” might be shattered by a new Pacific war.4 For better or for worse, Southeast Asia, the region which has given birth to the most vigorous efforts to construct a regional security architecture designed to ensure long-term peace and stability in Asia and the wider Pacific Basin, is today confronted by a series of intractable problems that may well constitute the greatest tests it has faced since the end of the Cold War. Much has been said about the significance of the South China Sea for the security and development of the Indo-Pacific. This sea offers the shortest route from the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean. About half of the world’s commerce, half of global liquefied natural gas and a third of global crude oil transit through this body of water each year.5 Two-fifths of the world’s tuna are born in the South China Sea, contributing to a multibillion-dollar fisheries industry.6 These statistics, oft-cited, are just a few indicators of the South China Sea’s importance to the region and the world at large. A durable regional security system that can deliver lasting stability and prosperity for the Indo-Pacific cannot be constructed in the absence of a smoothly functioning regional maritime order in this critical area. Yet this body of water, blessed with so many valuable resources and crisscrossed by a network of vital sea-lanes, has become the home to some of the most intractable territorial disputes in Asia and a stage for intensifying great power strategic competition. The longstanding territorial and maritime disputes simmering in the South China Sea and the machinations of great powers have been slowing down the momentum for regional cooperation and frustrating attempts to forge a robust and mutually beneficial security architecture. There is also another troubling dimension of very great significance. While the tempo of regional cooperation has slackened, the rate at which the South China Sea marine environment is deteriorating has accelerated. Forty percent of the South China Sea’s fish stocks have already been exhausted and, according to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, most fish resources in the western part of the South China Sea have been exploited or overexploited.7 Meanwhile, 70 percent of the South China Sea’s coral reefs are reported to be in poor or only fair condition.8 Put simply, while the challenges to the South China Sea marine environment are growing, the capacity of regional mechanisms to effectively address those challenges has been undermined or severely constrained.
Ulf Bernitz, Moa Mårtensson, Lars Oxelheim and Thomas Persson
The introductory chapter provides an overview of the great social challenge that the EU currently faces. The editors raise the question of what can be done to bridge the prosperity gap in Europe. First, they briefly describe the background: the social dimension of European cooperation and its historical development. Second, they identify the new social challenges that the Union faces in the wake of the Great Recession, the ongoing refugee crisis, and the Brexit referendum. Third, an analytical point of departure for examining these challenges is presented, consisting of an interdisciplinary approach that pinpoints a number of overarching problems and possibilities associated with the social dimension of European integration. Fourth and finally, the book’s chapters are introduced, and their key policy recommendations are summarized. The chapter concludes with the argument that much of the EU’s future relevance and ability to stay together depends on its capacity to counteract the prosperity gap and reverse the negative trend that emerged during the crisis.
The Social Challenge Ahead
Edited by Ulf Bernitz, Moa Mårtensson, Lars Oxelheim and Thomas Persson
This chapter analyses the future of national systems of social insurance in the EU. In Europe, social insurance remains a national responsibility, but the EU’s power to promote the internal market and to develop the social rights connected to EU citizenship challenges the autonomy of the member states. The chapter explains and analyses the tensions that arise in this area when different interests contend. Legal developments in this field raise the question of how the member states’ social security systems should be organized in the future, in conjunction with an expansive body of EU law. The author concludes that the models developed for the future should aim to bridge the gaps in social well-being which currently characterize the EU, without altogether eroding the differences between the welfare models of the different member states. In an increasingly globalized world, the EU’s future lies in community and not in national particularity.
This chapter analyses how the tension between fiscal discipline and responsiveness to popular demands contributes to widening the prosperity gap in Europe. On the one hand, the author argues, the countries most affected by the Great Recession still have a pressing need to strengthen their budget balances and to reduce their debt levels. If they fail to improve fiscal discipline, they will remain vulnerable to economic crises in the future. On the other hand, austerity is often met by public resistance. The political consequences of going against the voters’ preferences can be dramatic and pave the way for populist parties. Thus, governments should not only increase their budgetary safety margins during upturns in the business cycle, but also take measures to increase public support for fiscal discipline. This will reduce the tension they experience between fiscal responsibility and electoral responsiveness.
Edited by Ulf Bernitz, Moa Mårtensson, Lars Oxelheim and Thomas Persson
This chapter looks at how the prosperity gap between the member states is affected by the free movement of workers within the EU. One key purpose of free movement is to even out economic imbalances between the member states. The author’s analysis shows that labour mobility within the Union is too limited to make any significant contribution to economic equalization between the member states. However, mobility still has positive effects in terms of the income gain it implies for the migrants themselves and by helping to reduce labour shortages in specific sectors in specific countries. Contrary to common belief, moreover, migrants contribute somewhat more to the public purse than they cost. The author concludes that the Union and its member states should strive to uphold the free movement of labour, although it has never been as questioned as it is today.
Nicholas Charron and Bo Rothstein
This chapter explores the factors that operate at a societal level to build or destroy social trust. The analysis is based on unique data about the quality of public institutions at the regional level within the EU, and the authors test the tenability of four common explanations for variations in social trust: economic inequality, ethnic diversity, the quality of public institutions, and the degree of political participation by citizens. The analysis shows that the quality of public institutions is the strongest factor underlying regional variations in trust within countries. Economic inequality also proves to be a factor to be reckoned with for explaining variations in social trust. By contrast, the degree of ethnic diversity and the extent to which citizens participate politically have less importance for variations in trust. The overall conclusion is that increasing the quality of public institutions should have first priority if our aim is to reduce the prosperity gap between countries and regions in Europe.