Browse by title

You are looking at 1 - 10 of 2,435 items :

  • Human Rights x
  • Politics and Public Policy x
Clear All
You do not have access to this content

Mark Goodale

This afterword to the volume offers critical reflections on the book’s major contributions and situates them in relation to wider debates over the future of the International Criminal Court, the possibilities for international justice, and the question of whether or not human rights should remain an important part of international law. More specifically, the afterword examines the ways in which the volume privileges a distance-near perspective on the relationship between law and culture at the ICC, including, importantly, insiders’ accounts of how culture shapes the inner workings of the Court, its administrative and prosecutorial activities, and its responses to wider critiques of its investigations. The afterword concludes by considering the volume’s central claim that it is through a study of the intersections of law and culture that we can best understand the dilemmas faced by the Court and its prospects for the future.

This content is available to you

Edited by Julie Fraser and Brianne McGonigle Leyh

You do not have access to this content

Edited by Julie Fraser and Brianne McGonigle Leyh

This pioneering book explores the intersections of law and culture at the International Criminal Court (ICC), offering insights into how notions of culture affect the Court’s legal foundations, functioning and legitimacy, both in theory and in practice.
You do not have access to this content

Can We Still Afford Human Rights?

Critical Reflections on Universality, Proliferation and Costs

Edited by Jan Wouters, Koen Lemmens, Thomas Van Poecke and Marie Bourguignon

This insightful book offers a critical reflection on the sustainability and effectiveness of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and its legacy over the last 70 years. Exploring the problems surrounding universality, proliferation and costs, it asks the provocative question, can we still afford human rights?
You do not have access to this content

Hired Guns and Human Rights

Global Governance and Access to Remedies in the Private Military and Security Industry

Kuzi Charamba

This innovative book provides an overview and critical assessment of the current avenues and remedies available to victims seeking recourse from private military and security companies (PMSCs) for human rights violations.
This content is available to you

Kuzi Charamba

You do not have access to this content

Joe Wills

This article considers objections to current litigation strategies of the US-based Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), which seek to extend legal personhood and liberty rights to nonhuman animals who possess ‘practical autonomy’. By tying personhood to intellectual abilities, so the objections go, such strategies endanger the present legal standing of humans with profound cognitive impairments. This article will argue that such cause for concern is largely misplaced for two reasons. First, the NhRP argue that practical autonomy is only a sufficient condition for personhood, not a necessary one. Second, drawing on theoretical and empirical literature, the article will argue that speciesism itself is a multiplier of oppressive theories, attitudes, beliefs and practices that negatively affect marginalized humans, including humans with cognitive impairments. The NhRP's attempts to reduce speciesism in the legal domain are thus hypothesized as being part of the solution to discrimination against marginalized humans, not as part of the problem.

You do not have access to this content

Juan Pablo Mañalich R.

A being to which intentional states – such as desires or preferences – may be ascribed is a being capable of having (actual) interests, whereas to be the subject of interests of some kind is both a necessary and sufficient condition to be the holder of individual rights. After clarifying the sense in which, according to the ‘interest-theory’, the notion of a rights-subject specifies a distinctive normative status, this article will highlight the importance of distinguishing between subjectivity-dependent interests capable of being attributed to conscious beings, on the one hand, and biologically structured needs of conscious and nonconscious living beings, on the other. This distinction allows one to see that the moral requirement of recognizing legal rights for (individual) animals ought not to be conflated with biocentric demands of ecological justice. However, the argument thus delineated will not, without more, answer the crucial question of which specific legal rights ought to be ascribed to nonhuman animals. The article closes with an exploration of the need for holding onto the distinction between rights-subjecthood and personhood by analyzing some implications of Tooley's ‘particular-interest principle’.